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ABSTRACT 
Patent policy has been dominated lately by efforts to reduce rent-
seeking patent troll litigation. As recent reforms begin to take effect, it is 
timely to consider the more constructive aspects of patent litigation. This 
Article contends that the lag between product development and patent lit-
igation, which pushes the problem of patent valuation into the ex post (af-
ter product development) period, serves just such a positive function. Re-
search, development, and product roll-out can all take place first. Then, 
at a later stage, patent litigation sorts out the relative merits and contri-
butions of the various inventors and competitors who contributed to the 
new product or technology. In the time between early commercialization 
and litigation, a good deal of helpful information comes to light about the 
product and its market. This makes valuation more tractable, especially 
as compared with the early (ex ante) development period, when uncer-
tainty is high. Litigation also serves as a structured process that promotes 
party settlement, adding another dimension to its potentially positive role. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent policy has been shaped for the past 15 years by a single 
imperative: reduce rent-seeking patent litigation.1 The strengthening of 
patents that began with the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 
culminated in the rise of the patent trolls: companies in the business of 
acquiring and asserting patents whose social value is dubious. The trouble 
with trolls can be summed up this way: litigation instead of innovation. 
Trolls either bring nuisance value suits, settling them on the cheap but 
making up for low margins with high volume; or they target successful 
products manufactured by others, using patents as a way to extract as 
much of the value of these products as they can. Troll patents leverage 
1. On the other hand, patent doctrine has long favored litigation as a way to weed out invalid 
patents. The value of patent litigation as a way to increase competition via patent invalidation has 
been challenged in recent years. See Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase 
Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1943 (2016).  
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someone else’s large sunk investments, fixed designs, and high switching 
costs—allowing trolls to extract value when they did not help create it.2 
Because the leverage in troll litigation comes from sunk costs, this 
type of litigation (and the troll licensing demands that go with it) is 
described as “ex post.” It comes after the target defendant has made its 
investment. The future profits associated with this investment constitute 
what economists call a rent. Patent owners bring ex post litigation hoping 
to capture the value of these rents. And so, targeted defendants end up 
paying money to patent owners as a way to keep from losing some of the 
value (rents) created by their own investments.3 
Ex ante patent activity is different. It comes before third parties have 
independently developed a technology. It also necessarily precedes the 
finalization of product designs, as well as irreversible investments, i.e., 
sunk costs.4 It represents a positive role for patents: facilitation of market 
2. On the social welfare costs of patent trolls, see Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Due 
Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 
15-002, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2464303 [https://perma.cc/QUY7-VZN6]; Stephen 
Kiebzak, Greg Rafert & Catherine E. Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion 
Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity 3–4 (June 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457611 [https://perma.cc/Z5ZG-4TFS]; Roger Smeets, Does Patent 
Litigation Reduce Corporate R&D? An Analysis of U.S. Public Firms, 3–5 (Apr. 28, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443048 [https://perma.cc/S2UF-2UN7]. To 
summarize: trolls are bad. 
3. See Richard A. Posner, Patent Trolls, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (July 21, 2013),
https://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/index.html [http://perma.cc/386K-5PUC] (“It is 
extremely difficult to discern any possible social benefit from trolls, and extremely easy to discern 
substantial social costs.”); Robert G. Bone, Of Trolls, Orphans, and Abandoned Marks: What’s 
Wrong with Not Using Intellectual Property?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 51 n. 172 (2018) (“One 
might argue that [trolls] should be condemned on moral grounds regardless of how they fare in a 
utilitarian analysis. If holdup is morally blameworthy—which seems quite sensible given its close 
affinity with extortion—it should matter for moral evaluation that a PAE builds its entire business 
model around holdup.”). 
4. See Federal Trade Commission, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and 
Remedies with Competition 7–8 (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/evolving-ip-
marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-remedies-competition [https://perma.cc/BV49-425M]: 
Patent transactions that occur as part of a technology transfer agreement can be considered 
ex ante because they occur before the purchaser has obtained the technology through other 
means. Such ex ante patent transactions accompanied by technology transfer are an 
important means for advancing innovation, creating wealth, and increasing competition 
among technologies. 
See also Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition 
and Patent Law and Policy 23 (Oct. 2003), http://ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V79T-4S4L] (discussing two-stage pioneer/improver models of technology 
development): 
Negotiation is more likely to divide rewards to support efficient follow-on activity if 
licensing occurs ex ante, that is, before the follow-on innovator makes its sunk 
investments. Although incentives to enter ex ante licenses often may be present, the 
3
Merges: Patent Litigation as Ex Post Market-Making
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
558 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:555 
transactions. Product components and manufacturing processes are easier 
to sell in market transactions when covered by patents. Patents make 
contracts easier to negotiate. And of course, patents figure crucially in the 
market for pure ideas or inventions. Without patents, it is hard to sell an 
idea, because once you explain it the other party has it and there is nothing 
left to sell. In both cases—complex components and pure ideas—patents 
protect sellers and facilitate contracting. In these cases, patent-related 
profits are attributable to the market value of the patented item, rather than 
to illicit leverage or high switching costs. The presence of patents in the 
ex ante period, in other words, makes it easier for parties to contract. Ex 
ante, patents add value. 
To summarize: patents as tools of ex post rent extraction are bad. 
Patents as tools for ex ante exchange are good. 
The ex ante/ex post distinction has performed admirably in the 
battles over patent reform. But now that those battles are beginning to 
recede, we need to revisit this distinction. In the simple before/after view, 
litigation is associated with activity that takes place after a potential 
infringement defendant has made irreversible investments. It is 
inconceivable that the decision to forego ex ante patent negotiations 
would be made intentionally by the potential defendant—the infringer. 
Furthermore, from a more global perspective, patent litigation must only 
very rarely make any positive contribution to social welfare. Welfare-
enhancing patent activities should all take place in the ex ante period. And 
it follows that patent activities that take place later—ex post—must be a 
drain on valuable resources. 
As the troll wars begin to recede, we need to recognize that the 
simple ex ante/ex post distinction is deficient. It lacks subtlety. When 
patent negotiations are seen in their true light, we will see that sometimes 
it makes sense for an infringer to forego ex ante negotiations until after 
the completion of product development. It is just this possibility that I 
explore in this Article. 
Hearings and related scholarship suggested reasons that licensing may not occur ex ante 
in some circumstances. 
I do not mean to confuse the ex post period with ex post justifications for IP rights. Cf. Mark A. 
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 
(2004) (Ex post justifications for IP rights “focus not on the incentive to create new ideas, but on what 
happens to those ideas after they have been developed. I refer to these new arguments as ex post 
justifications for intellectual property because they defend intellectual property rights not on the basis 
of the incentives they give to create new works, but on the basis of the incentives they give to manage 
or control works that have already been created.”). 
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II. THE BENEFITS OF WAITING
Because the ex ante/ex post distinction arose in service of patent 
reform, the ex post period is usually seen as one in which the accused 
infringer, the ultimate defendant, is vulnerable. The gap between ex ante 
and ex post, in other words, is one that the patent owner exploits. But I 
believe there are times when the gap is at least neutral—it can’t be helped, 
and is not intrinsically a bad thing for a potential infringer. More than this, 
there are times when a potential defendant will actively choose to take 
advantage of the gap. Waiting, in these cases, is a choice that helps the 
future patent licensee/defendant. It is not a matter of vulnerability; it is a 
matter of choice. 
As I explain later on, the reason this choice might make sense is that 
waiting to negotiate patent issues can be beneficial. In debates over troll 
litigation, sunk costs and fixed designs only help patent owners. They 
generate leverage. But there is a more positive side to waiting. Patent 
negotiations can be complex and time-consuming. Resources devoted to 
negotiating in the ex ante period must be taken from other projects and 
activities. Complete and detailed ex ante negotiations come with 
opportunity costs. When these are high enough—when devoting resources 
to negotiating ex ante would starve or drain a crucial activity such as 
product development—it makes sense to wait. 
Waiting has another benefit too. In the ex ante period, there are many 
unknowns. Will the product under development be successful? How 
important will the patented technology be to the product design, and to 
market demand for the product accused of infringing? Are there 
alternatives to the patented technology that may emerge, putting 
downward pressure on the value of the patent? Do the parties have all the 
prior art that is relevant to the patent, or will more prior art come to light 
over time, affecting the predictions about whether the patent is valid or 
not?5 
5. The decision to delay patent negotiations assumes there is some degree of certainty over
whether a given patent claim will cover the potential defendant’s product design. But delay need not 
be the result of the well-known problem of “notice failure,” which arises from ambiguous or vague 
patent claim language. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 
5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2013). With clearer notice, more ex ante deal making would occur. But better 
notice would not shift all or perhaps even most deal making into the ex ante period. The unknowns I 
describe—product success, availability of alternatives, knowledge about prior art—are unrelated to 
notice. Thus, while I wholeheartedly support the Menell-Meurer proposals regarding improved notice 
from patent claims, I do not believe those proposals would entirely eliminate the need for ex ante 
market-making in the form of patent litigation. Notice failure ought to be remedied when at all 
possible; but not all patent litigation is caused by notice failure. On notice-related uncertainty, see 
5
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Delaying patent negotiations has its costs, but it also means the 
parties will have much better information.6 To the extent that bargaining 
is facilitated when parties know more, waiting can be quite helpful. Poor 
information can, at times, lead to less overlap in the parties’ bargaining 
ranges, which drives down the chance they will agree on a deal. As time 
passes there is a reduction in uncertainty. Delay will usually bring more 
clarity. A voluntary deal becomes more likely. In this respect, as with 
opportunity costs, waiting can be good for the licensee/defendant, as well 
as the patent owner. 
A. Strategic Delay in Patent Disputes
There are two conceptual errors that lead to the simplistic
condemnation of ex post patent deals. First is that relatively early deal 
making is fairer to both parties; it implements private ordering without 
facilitating rent-seeking. Second is that patent litigation—which is often 
the instrument of economic exchange in the ex post period—is very often 
or usually a bad thing, to be discouraged. In a considerable number of 
cases, each of these ideas may be wrong. The reason is that, according to 
the well-known literature on strategic delay in bargaining, there is a good 
side to delay. If delay is beneficial, then the ex post period may not always 
be a bad time for deal making. And litigation may not always be a bad 
way to structure patent-related exchange. 
To begin, waiting does not always lead to litigation. Ex post licensing 
is quite frequent in the patent world. One reason is that prospective 
licensees do not always know which patents to license. It can be difficult 
also Joseph Farrell, Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment, 9 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE 
ECON. 39, 41 (2009): 
One common and intuitively difficult information problem arises when a producer does 
not know with whom it must negotiate concerning patents. One might call this a “potential-
patent thicket,” as distinct from the “actual-patent thicket” that can create multiple-
marginalization problems when many patents are known to be infringed by a product. If a 
technology user cannot even list the patent holders who can block its product, negotiation 
will be very difficult. 
6. Information emerges during the delay period as products are introduced onto the market;
the technology in question continues to develop; and more industry patents are issued, and more 
scientific and technical publications come to light (i.e., the “prior art” in the field grows). Delaying 
negotiations so as to provoke litigation may lead to the surfacing of other information that arises 
specifically from litigation itself. See, e.g., John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Theories of Bargaining 
Delays, 249 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1990) (footnote omitted): 
A common view too is that negotiations are not concluded until the issue is ripe for 
settlement. . . . [R]ipeness might be interpreted in terms of increased costs of further delay 
or acquisition or inference of new information; but possibly delay enables clarification of 
consequences or preferences. A relevant instance in legal contexts is the opportunity that 
delay provides to proceed with discovery or auxiliary court tests such as appeals. 
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to know which of the many patents in a certain field actually cover a 
product that is newly introduced on the market. Even where “patent 
notice” is adequate, not all patent owners choose to enforce their patents 
against all potential infringers. Because the burden is on the patent owner 
to identify infringement and institute enforcement actions, it can make 
sense for a prospective defendant to let enforcement-minded patent 
owners identify themselves. By definition, any enforcement that happens 
as a result is ex post. It is the product introduction that leads the patent 
owner to the infringer. 
Even if a patent owner is known to a prospective defendant, it can 
still make sense to put off patent bargaining. Strategic delay, as it is 
known, has its uses. This is true in all fields, including the licensing of 
patents. 
An important reason for delay relates to the information available to 
one or both parties.7 Information is vital to bargaining. A patent owner 
wants to know how many units of infringing product the infringer will 
sell. Beyond this, it wants to know how much its technology contributes 
to the actual profits of the patent infringer-defendant: Does the patent 
cover a vital component in the defendant’s product—one that drives sales 
and is crucial to the infringer’s revenue stream and profit margin? Is the 
patented technology unique or are there ready substitutes for it? Then 
there are party-specific facts that would be helpful to know. Can the 
infringer finance a protracted patent fight? Are the defendant’s principals 
tied up in important work that would be seriously interrupted by dealing 
with a patent dispute? And so on. 
On the other side, the infringer wants to know its potential revenue 
and profit from the sale of the infringing product. It might not be worth it 
to fight over a patent on some part of the product if the product will flop. 
Also, the infringer will want to know if there are alternatives to the 
patented design: Will it be easy or hard to re-design the product to avoid 
infringement? Will an alternative design raise costs? And as to patent 
validity, do we have access to the best patent-defeating prior art? Is there 
prior art that threatens the patentee’s claims? If we do not yet know, how 
expensive will it be to find out?8 
7. See Deepak Somaya, How Patent Strategy Affects the Timing and Method of Patent
Litigation Resolution, in Strategy Beyond Markets, in 34 ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
471, 477 (2016),  (“Due to the substantial technological and commercial uncertainties that are typical 
with patents, potential future advantages arising from patent-based exclusivity are generally difficult 
to predict and therefore specify in a licensing contract.”). 
8. The advent of administrative patent validity trials, referred to in some patent systems as
“oppositions,” makes much more information about validity available at a much earlier stage. Before 
2011, when these trials were introduced in the U.S., this information came out more slowly in a full-
7
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In all these ways, more information often becomes available over 
time. And information is vital to successful bargaining. With perfect 
information, there is no need for adjudication at all: Why wait for a court 
to reach the solution that the parties themselves can find?9 Even short of 
this, the more information the parties have, the more likely there will be 
some potential agreements that they both will think acceptable given the 
facts. In technical terms, revealed information increases the chances that 
the “bargaining ranges” of the parties will overlap. 
With respect to delay, one economist describes the bargaining 
situation between two economic agents (e.g., patent owner and possible 
infringer) this way: 
The agents must both therefore trade off the costs and benefits of delay 
against the compromise required to win immediate agreement. . . . In 
uncertain market conditions, agents learn while bargaining occurs. In 
addition, . . . agents may hold differing views on the asset’s popularity 
[i.e., potential market] as the market conditions have not been replicated 
in every detail in the past. Thus . . . the agents may disagree as to their 
respective bargaining powers and will alter these views to reflect market 
realizations. Thus equilibrium bargaining delay, or stalling, may result 
as the players cannot agree on a compromise price which reflects the 
differing views as to the asset’s popularity.10 
Delay can also send a signal to the other party—a signal with strategic 
value. One common model along these lines shows delay sending a signal 
of bargaining strength: I don’t need to reach agreement right away, I can 
blown patent infringement trial. Availability of an Inter Partes Review, as oppositions are known in 
the U.S., thus substantially changes the bargaining dynamic in patent disputes. See generally Farrell, 
supra note 5, at 41, : 
Information asymmetry is likely to be reduced when more information is publicly 
available. Thus it would seem that ex post licensing negotiations should, on average, go 
more smoothly if more information on patent validity were brought out publicly at an early 
stage, as perhaps by more thorough Patent Office examination, and/or an early opportunity 
for public opposition. 
9. This assumes there is no payoff for trying to influence or trick a court. Even if the parties
know the true state of affairs, in other words, they might expend resources to persuade a judge to 
accept a version of the facts that favors one side or the other. This is a particular risk when the parties 
are experts in a field, but the judge is not. 
10. John Thanassoulis, Optimal Stalling When Bargaining, 34 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & 
CONTROL 101, 101 (2010). By extension, the decision to forego early settlement in favor of litigation 
follows the same logic. See Somaya, supra note 7, at 476: 
By seeking . . . adjudication, the parties forego at least some cost savings from settling and 
avoiding adjudication altogether, and must therefore have concluded that the prospects for 
settlement are poor relative to the advantages gained from adjudication.  
8
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wait, you might cave in and my position is strong in any event.11 Where 
uncertainty is very high, delay often pays off. Indeed, a company may be 
willing to pay some money up front (e.g., by commencing negotiations or 
investing in a patent challenge at the Patent Office) to “buy time,” because 
delaying the ultimate bargaining settlement until later gives more 
flexibility. This is, of course, the “real options” framework. Using this 
framework, economists have modeled strategic delay in the competition 
between two companies engaged in competing R&D projects.12 Patent-
related threats are, of course, one effective instrument in this kind of 
“delay game.” 
Finally, delay can also affect one’s reputation. Because there are 
typically numerous patents that may cover one or more features of a 
complex product, a prospective licensee may benefit from a reputation for 
being a hard bargainer. Delay is closely associated with such a reputation. 
As one review article puts it, “[E]ach party’s continuing struggle is an 
investment in a reputation for likely being stronger, which earns a 
profitable return if the other capitulates first.”13 
B. A Positive Role for Patent Litigation
In policy circles, as I have said, patent litigation is often associated
with patent trolls and rent-seeking. Even putting aside the problem of rent 
extraction, however, several strands of economic research have addressed 
the high social cost of patent litigation. Galasso and Schankerman, for 
example, found that one bad experience with patent litigation can be 
enough to significantly tamp down the research ambitions of a small 
company, and in some cases, bring small company research programs to 
a full stop.14 Likewise, Lee, Oh and Suh find that patent litigation badly 
hurts defendant firms (those sued for infringement): their financial picture 
11. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, Strategic Delay in Bargaining, 54 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 345 (1987); Peter C. Cramton, Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-sided Uncertainty, 59 
REV. ECON. STUD. 205 (1992); Christophe Chamley & Douglas Gale, Information Revelation and 
Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment, 62 ECONOMETRICA 1065 (1994). Delay in the presence of 
a deadline (e.g., product introduction date, or a date after which a court injunction would be ruinous) 
can also increase one’s bargaining leverage; the deadline forces the other party to accept a deal that 
would not be accepted in the absence of a deadline. See Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Manove, 
Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control, 61 ECONOMETRICA 1313 (1993). 
12. Helen Weeds, Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition, 69 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 729, 729 (2002) (“According to the theory of real options uncertainty generates an 
option value of delay.”). 
13. Kennan & Wilson, supra note 6, at 1126. 
14. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent Rights, Innovation and Firm Exit, 49 
RAND J. ECON. 64, (2018).  
9
Merges: Patent Litigation as Ex Post Market-Making
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
564 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:555 
deteriorates; they reduce innovation activities; and they pursue narrower 
research projects to reduce the risk of litigation in the future.15 
In the face of so much evidence, is it possible to mount any kind of 
a defense of patent litigation? I think so. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, litigation can be a more efficient substitute for ex ante deal 
making in some cases. When the transaction costs of striking a timely ex 
ante deal are too high, ex ante contracting can be replaced by negotiation 
at a later time—negotiation that may well result in litigation. 
The argument starts here: Though voluntary ex ante licensing is the 
ideal, it is in reality not always efficient. Sometimes it’s not even possible. 
It may be difficult to identify all the relevant patents that must be or might 
be licensed. In a time-critical development project, every available 
contributor may be needed to ship the new product on time. If future profit 
hinges on early product introduction, it might make sense to delay patent-
related negotiations. And finally, it may be difficult and expensive to 
bargain in advance over an appropriate royalty rate, given the 
complexities of patent validity, patent infringement, and estimates of 
potential damages. For all these reasons it may not make sense in a given 
case to identify all patent owners and bargain for patent licenses with all 
of them ex ante.16 In addition to the general benefits of delayed 
bargaining, identified earlier, there are patent-law-specific reasons why it 
might make sense to litigate rather than strike an up-front deal quickly. 
15. Jongsub Lee, Seungjoon Oh & Paula Suh, Inter-firm Patent Litigation and Innovation
Competition (Working Paper, Dec. 10, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3298557 [https://perma.cc/
E97S-CKEW]. 
16. Consider this, on the benefits of waiting: 
Viola: “O time, thou must untangle this, not I.
It is too hard a knot for me t’ untie!” 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT, act 2, sc. 2. 
10
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Litigation alleviates a number of transaction costs.17 It shifts the 
resolution of patent issues out of the ex ante period.18 In a given case, this 
may be more efficient, for two primary reasons: 
Opportunity cost. Litigation allows a company to focus exclusively on 
product development, in effect shifting the time and resource burden of 
patent-related negotiations from period 1 (development) to period 2 
(post-development negotiation/litigation). 
Information cost. By moving the patent negotiation to a later period, the 
parties have the benefit of more, and sometimes much more, 
information: product sales data for the accused product (and perhaps the 
patent owner’s product); the value of and alternatives to the patented 
technology; and a more complete picture of the relevant prior art. 
C. Litigation and Ex Ante Opportunity Cost
Post-product introduction negotiations or litigation puts off patent-
related negotiations until after product launch. This is a little-noticed 
advantage of litigation compared to ex ante contracting. It could be crucial 
when it is imperative to speed up product development as much as 
possible. Patent licensing is complex and often time-consuming. It takes 
time and effort to negotiate a good result.19 During product development 
17. The arguments here depend on an ex ante cost-benefit analysis, weighing the costs and
benefits of additional resources being devoted to patent clearance. As you might expect, practitioners 
in the field approach this issue using exactly this type of analysis. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Nelson & Scott 
D. Locke, Freedom to Operate Opinions: Worth the Cost?, 33 ASSOC. CORP. COUNSEL DOCKET 86, 
97–98 (2015) (discussing cost-benefit analysis for use of (more expensive) outside counsel for
“freedom to operate” (patent clearance) purposes): 
You will want to triage when to retain outside counsel, and before reaching out to outside counsel,
you will want to balance these factors: (1) cost; (2) how close a question it appears to be after your
review; and (3) the value of the product to the company. When the cost of the opinion is comparable 
to the likely profit or the product is likely to be sold on a limited scale for a limited time, usually there 
is no need to reach out to outside counsel. 
18. Of course, it is possible to negotiate an ex post license without having to go to court. Even 
so, an appreciable slice of patent litigation is of the ex post variety. One explanation is that, unlike 
with ex ante dealmaking, time may not be of the essence in the ex post period. Litigation is still 
expensive, but in the ex post period it cannot by definition slow down product development. So at 
least in some cases the definitive resolution of a conflict may be worth it in the ex post period, whereas 
expediency might dictate a quick, non-litigated resolution of that conflict if it arose ex ante. In any 
event I am not suggesting that all licensing in the ex post period ought to be mediated by litigation. 
As is always true, the cases that are litigated will illuminate and guide the many private licensing and 
settlement deals made outside the context of litigation. 
19. One extensive empirical study found that litigation is more common when the patent owner 
considers patents more important to its business strategy—when it uses patents directly for profit 
maximization, rather than using them for leverage to obtain related goals or defensively, to prevent 
monetary loss from other patent holders. Because these patent holders care more about structuring 
licensing contracts carefully, licensing negotiations take longer. This leads to later resolution of patent 
11
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cycles, this is time and effort that may be in short supply. A company in 
the midst of developing a product must choose carefully how to allocate 
its resources. Every person-hour devoted to patent licensing is a person-
hour taken from other tasks. In the case of researchers and product 
development specialists, the opportunity cost of attending to licensing 
negotiations might be very high in some cases.20 
It is easiest to see this by way of a diagram. In a product development 
project, multiple teams of people have to coordinate to achieve product 
launch.21 Given the need to train and acclimate people to the project, in 
the short run the number of people is fixed. Thus more attention for one 
function means less attention to another. Putting more people, and more 
of their time, on patent transactions means fewer person-hours for other 
tasks. This is represented in the two figures below. In Figure 1, the scale 
up/troubleshoot team is fully staffed for the duration of the project. In 
Figure 2, it is not. People are temporarily moved from the scale 
up/troubleshoot team to the legal and marketing team—the team tasked 
with patent search and patent licensing. 
disputes, and is associated with higher rates of litigation (because litigation is a product of delayed 
negotiation). Somaya, supra note 7, at 478. For patents that are very important to a company, those 
with “high strategic stakes,” and are part of a “proprietary [patent] strategy”: 
The higher the strategic stakes associated with a litigated patent, the more acute these 
contracting problems become, and therefore, the more difficult and time-consuming will 
it be to craft a suitable settlement to address these concerns. 
20. For clear empirical evidence on this point, see the invaluable study by Colleen Chien,
Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 472 (2014) (stating that surveyed 
entrepreneurial companies commonly reported “that resolving [a patent] demand required founder 
time (73%) and distracted from the core business (89%).”). 
21. Paul Ellwood, Paul Grimshaw & Krsto Pandza, Accelerating the Innovation Process: A
Systematic Review and Realist Synthesis of the Research Literature, 19 INT’L J. MGT. REVS. 510, 516 
(2017): 
Contexts of temporal conflict [in organizations working on an innovation] relate to 
aligning the pace of different innovation activities for the realization of accelerated 
outcomes. Within this context, we posit that speed is realized by synchronization 
interventions that . . . ensure the most efficient and effective alignment of interactions 
between innovation actors and processes. 
Contexts of temporal scarcity relate to identifying the most valuable innovation activities 
to be conducting at any point for the realization of accelerated outcomes. Within this 
context, we posit that speed is realized by resource allocation interventions that . . . 
identify the most valuable tasks to conduct at any point in time. 
12
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Figure 1: Product Development Staffing, Low Attention to Patents 
13
Merges: Patent Litigation as Ex Post Market-Making
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
568 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:555 
Figure 2: Product Development, High Attention to Patents 
Product delivery slips under the scenario in Figure 2, from T1 to T2. 
Whatever costs the company experiences due to this slip are the 
opportunity costs of putting more effort into reviewing and licensing 
patents. 
This opportunity cost may be zero, low, or high. The firm involved 
may be best placed to predict. High opportunity costs are quite plausible, 
especially where the product development is in heavy competition with 
other firms. The cost of a slip from T1 to T2 can be quite significant if lead 
time is important, if early mover advantages tend to reverberate over time, 
or if market share is heavily influenced by relative entry dates. 
You can see the potential losses that might be involved by 
considering one example. Imagine a firm, developing a new product, 
estimates that market entry will affect initial profits according to the 
following function. 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/3
2020] PATENT LITIGATION AS EX POST MARKET-MAKING 569 
Figure 3: Profit/Market Share as a Function of Market Entry Date 
A firm facing this situation will assess the cost of patent search and 
negotiation, given the size of the teams it has to work with. The basic 
tradeoff is between profit loss due to a potential delay in entry, and the 
anticipated ex post cost of patent infringement. The first step in 
calculating this tradeoff is to estimate the size of the market entry-related 
opportunity cost, measured by the difference between P1 and P2. Then, the 
firm would need to estimate the potential cost of patent litigation—
litigation, by assumption, that would only occur if the scale 
up/troubleshooting team was kept on its main task and not diverted to 
patent clearance. (The staffing situation of Figure 1, in other words.) 
For any patent lawsuit, the expected outcome is the sum of (1) the 
situation if the accused infringer wins (patent owner loses) and (2) the 
situation if the accused infringer loses (patent owner wins). If a 
manufacturer saves enough money by avoiding ex ante transaction costs, 
litigation can actually be more efficient. To see how this is conceivable, 
consider some of the transaction costs listed above. Assuming that the 
accused infringer will not be able to recoup its attorney fees, the expected 
cost of litigation is the sum of the smaller loss if the infringer wins and 
the larger loss if it loses. Taking PW as the probability the accused 
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infringer wins the lawsuit, and PL as the probability of a loss, this can be 
written as follows: 
[(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊) ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊)] + [(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿) ∗ (𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿)] 
where CW is the cost of a win by the accused infringer (its attorney fees), 
and EL is the expected value of a loss. This expected value is the estimated 
damages the accused infringer will have to pay, plus the accused 
infringer’s attorney fees—[ProbL x (Expected Damages)] + CW (i.e., 
attorney fees). 
Now plug in some plausible numbers. Assume first that the profit 
differential from devoting more people to patent clearance—the 
opportunity cost of market entry at T2 rather than T1—is $25 million. You 
can think of this as either the loss in sales of the new product in the first 
year due to delayed entry, or the capitalized cost of smaller market share 
over the useful life of this product design, again due to delayed entry. Next 
note that $5 million is the average cost of patent litigation. We will take 
the patent owner’s chance of winning as the average across patent cases, 
roughly .4 or 40%. 
As these figures show, the accused infringer firm would risk a 
potential infringement suit with costs and damages of up to $55 million in 
exchange for keeping its employees focused primarily on product design, 
scale-up, and market entry.22 The decision to put off patent search and 
negotiating would be rational with expected attorney fees and damages 
that total $55 million or less. 
Obviously, if the opportunity cost of delayed entry is lower, it makes 
more sense to dedicate additional resources to ex ante patent clearance. 
This would be true, for example, if the project under consideration is an 
add-on to an existing product that enjoys a large market share. Adding a 
few features to an existing product would not normally be expected to 
have a large impact on profits or market share. But if those features were 
crucial, timing might be important even for an established product. The 
point is that this is a matter of choice. 
Empirical evidence shows that there can be a significant premium on 
early market entry by “first movers.” In the recent past, first movers in 
major product innovations such as laser printers, compact disc players, 
22. (.6)($5 mil) + (.4)($55 mil) = $25 mil., the benefit of earlier market entry. 
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and video games have, on average, had the market to themselves for 4.33 
years.23 
Closely related to first-mover advantage is the idea of path 
dependence. The classic work in this vein explains how small, random 
events when a technology is new lay down tracks that influence future 
developments in profound ways. Path dependence explains why, for 
example, the Sony BetaMax VCR format came to dominate the field of 
video recording. It also explains how the QWERTY English-language 
keyboard came to be the standard layout. In extreme cases, early events 
make for advantages in a technology or format that become permanent. 
More recent work in this vein argues that early advantages are often 
limited to a single product generation, and not the entire lifetime of a 
pioneering firm or technology.24 
Regardless of the durability of a first mover advantage, there is little 
question that it can be important. At least some degree of extended market 
power is likely to attend a first mover. Even without full-scale lock in, the 
pattern or profitability may to some degree be path dependent. There is 
enough data, and enough hard-won experience, for decisionmakers in a 
firm to strongly favor early entrance. Given the tradeoffs inevitable in 
managing any firm, this can mean a conscious decision to skimp on or 
skip over patent clearance efforts before market entry. This, in turn, makes 
it more likely that the firm will end up in ex post patent litigation. If so, it 
will be the result of a conscious choice about firm priorities—a choice that 
the legal system ought not to condemn out of hand. 
III. EX POST MARKET-MAKING
When a patent is acquired or asserted only after third party design or 
investment, the patent can be used to take value that flows from the effort 
23. Rajshree Agarwal & Michael Gort, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of Competitive
Entry, 1887-1986, 44 J.L. & ECON. 161, 170 & 175 Table A1 (2001) (showing average period before 
second entrant for major innovations during period 1962–1986 was 4.33 years; Table lists the 45 
major innovations covered in the study). But see David Hricik, Will Patenting Make as Much Sense 
in the New Regime of Weakened Patent Rights and Shorter Product Life Cycles, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 457, 514 (2017) (arguing that contemporary product development requires less time, and 
second entrants can enter more quickly, than in the past). 
24. . See April M. Franco, M.B. Sarkar, Rajshree Agarwal & Raj Echembadi, Swift and Smart: 
The Moderating Effects of Technological Capabilities on the Market Pioneering-Firm Survival 
Relationship, 55 MGT. SCI. 1842, 1844 (2009) (arguing that superior performance over a sustained 
period requires early entry in a key market plus other firm resources and capabilities): 
The emergence of a new product generation creates a fresh opportunity to capitalize on 
potential strategic and economic advantages associated with being a market pioneer, even 
as it removes many path-dependent advantages associated with early entry that may have 
accrued to the market pioneers of the prior product generation. 
17
Merges: Patent Litigation as Ex Post Market-Making
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
572 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:555 
and investment of the third party. Especially when it would be very 
expensive for the third party to change its design, the patent owner can 
use its patent to extract some of the value created by the third party. The 
use of patents in this way goes against the traditional rationale for the 
patent system. Thus the widespread criticism of patent activity in this, the 
“ex post” period. 
Note that rent extraction of this type does represent a voluntary 
market transaction, in a sense. In broad outlines, it follows the contours of 
classic private ordering. The holder of an entitlement (patentee) asks a 
court to recognize its right to compensation from another private party 
(infringer). Parties often settle this type of lawsuit, and when they do, they 
can be said to follow the classic private law script: voluntary exchange, 
supervised by courts if necessary, based on initial state-granted 
entitlements, resulting in a bargain that leaves both parties better off. 
Patent reform implicitly challenged the validity of this narrative in 
the context of rent-seeking patent litigation. Patent reform efforts started 
with the observation that rent extraction was not the traditional purpose of 
the patent system. Reformers emphasized that troll litigation has little or 
nothing to do with innovation—–which is the purpose behind patents, 
after all. So for reformers, the market exchange fostered by troll lawsuits 
is not in fact an example of normal, beneficial deal making. Trolls take 
advantage of structural features of patent litigation, using these features to 
create illegitimate leverage. This makes patents instruments of rent 
extraction, rather than tokens of useful innovation. The fact of voluntary 
exchange is not the important issue. The issue is the weak, overvalued 
entitlements and the undue leverage they create. 
Because undue leverage comes only in the ex post period, reformers 
emphasized the merits of ex ante deal making. To see why, consider the 
typical ex ante patent license. A company in the midst of designing a new 
product might decide to incorporate a patented technology. If so it will 
license one or more patents covering that technology. This is no different 
from acquiring any other input into the product—a raw material, a third-
party component, new packaging, etc. Presumably, money paid to the 
patent owner represents the value of the patented item to the licensee’s 
planned product activities. The deal takes place before the third 
party/licensee has sunk costs, so the patent owner has no special leverage. 
The patent deal is a voluntary market transaction, plain and simple. 
Money earned by the patent owner in this case represents value she 
created. 
In comparing the two cases, a simple conceptual pairing seems to 
emerge. Ex post litigation, leading to market exchange, is not socially 
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valuable. The markets enabled by litigation (or the threat of litigation) in 
the ex post period are in some sense illegitimate; they emerge out of 
bargaining conditions that do not promote innovation. To state it baldly, 
these are “bad markets,” akin to the market for blackmail or stolen goods. 
Exchange in these cases may be voluntary, and it may leave the parties 
better off. But the preconditions for legitimate exchange are absent. Ex 
ante exchange precludes rent-seeking. It rewards the patent owner not 
because of undue leverage but because of the inherent value of the 
owner’s technology. So, ex ante patent markets are “good markets,” they 
organize private exchange to reward something truly worth rewarding. 
A. Beneficial Ex Post Licensing?
Now consider a twist—a common one, in fact. Imagine that the
product designer incorporates a patented component but does not license 
the patent first. And assume the patent owner acquired the patent in 
question prior to the design of the potential infringer’s product. The 
absence of a license could be for a number of reasons, as we have seen. 
The patent may have been pending (not yet issued); the product designer 
may not have known about the patent; or the designer might have thought 
its design fell outside the bounds of the patent. The patent owner, finding 
out about the design, might ask the designer for a license. If the parties 
negotiate one, the result is a variant of an ex ante deal, but one that is 
negotiated after product design and launch. But negotiations like these 
sometimes break down. When they do, the patent owner will often bring 
an infringement suit. At this point, a court steps into the picture. If the 
patent is eventually found valid and infringed, the court may provide some 
combination of remedies in favor of the patent owner. 
When this happens, the court is in effect being asked to engage in ex 
post market-making. It will have to decide (1) whether to issue an 
injunction preventing sale of products made according to the patent-
infringing design, and/or (2) whether and how much to compensate the 
patent owner for the harm suffered due to the infringement. 
When done right, this ex post market-making is the essence of useful 
(non-rent-seeking) patent litigation. Courts are asked to structure a 
remedy that emulates the ex ante deal that would have taken place had the 
parties struck one. But by the nature of litigation, this task is achieved ex 
post. 
Some factors mentioned earlier—especially uncertainty and 
information deficits—highlight the value of ex post market-making. In 
some sense, the patent market in some industries works in reverse. 
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Products emerge as winners; then, after that, the patent market is imposed 
on the industry in a series of licensing deals and patent litigations25 So 
long as ex post litigation is primarily about constructing legitimate, time-
delayed markets, and not rent-seeking, it can add value. 
B. Product Components and the Patent Market
IP rights of various sorts will usually cover one or more aspects of
an innovative technology. The purchase of a DVD or a computer printer 
may be characterized by the seller as a kind of dual transaction: there is 
the physical product, and there are also IP rights that cover features of the 
product. We need not concern ourselves here with the interplay of 
personal property concepts governing ownership of the physical object 
(DVD disk, printer) and IP concepts governing protected features; it is 
enough for us to understand that there is an IP component to this standard 
purchase and sale transaction. 
The IP component is much more apparent in a different type of 
transaction—the pure technology license. Indeed, in such a transaction, 
technology and IP rights (in particular patent rights) are often conflated. 
An innovative software compression algorithm, or superior map-
rendering software technique, may well be covered by one or more 
patents. The transfer of this innovative technology will often be 
effectuated via a patent license agreement. But for it to qualify as a true 
technology transaction, the buyer must gain access to a new technique or 
family of algorithms. That is, the buyer must acquire a capability that is 
attributable to the creator of the innovation, viz., the owner of the patent.26 
This may or may not involve a transfer of software code, algorithm 
flowcharts, programming techniques, or the like. But one way or another, 
the agreement must reflect the transfer of a new capability. 
Patents do not map cleanly onto product markets. Therefore, patent 
markets are different from product markets. Patents typically cover 
25. Technically, the market is only imposed when ex post conflicts are resolves via litigation. 
But because private ex post deals will naturally be heavily influenced by the decides cases stemming 
from litigation, court decisions imposing ex post royalty rates help to shape the entire ex post 
negotiation landscape. 
26. I phrased this carefully to capture the case where engineers working for the buyer already
know and use the patented technology, because they learned about it through various channels well 
before the buyer acquires rights to it in a formal transaction. Sometimes, in other words, the 
information has diffused around a field or industry well ahead of the time when a formal transfer 
agreement is reached. The formal agreement, in such a case, might be said to simply memorialize the 
information transfer which occurred informally at an earlier time. See generally Robert P. Merges, A 
Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 
(2016). 
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technological components: small pieces of larger technologies. A patent 
may cover: part of a mobile phone antenna, for instance; a technique for 
compressing data to be sent over a network; a method for encoding 
location information on a CD (an example we will return to later); or any 
of millions of other small technological components. 
Patents map onto technologies. The invention in an antenna patent 
may form part of a mobile phone antenna. The compression algorithm 
may be used in a software program for transmitting digital content such 
as music, video, or text. The popup menu may be part of a software 
program that handles calendaring or interfaces with travel-related 
websites. 
Technologies, in turn, map onto products. The antenna is part of a 
mobile phone. The compression algorithm is part of a data streaming 
program used by music streaming companies or video websites. The 
popup menu may be part of a travel website or a suite of software for a 
mobile or desktop device. 
Finally, products map onto markets. The mobile phone containing 
the antenna is sold in competition with other mobile devices, including 
phones, tablets, and watches. The data streaming program is incorporated 
into the software of one of several music streaming companies or is used 
by one video streaming service (Netflix, say) that competes with others 
(Amazon Prime or YouTube, for example). The popup menu may be part 
of a desktop operating system such as Microsoft Windows, which 
competes with free operating systems such as Android for mobile; or it 
may be incorporated into one travel website (Kayak, for example) that 
competes with others (e.g., Expedia). 
This complex, multi-step “mapping” can be summarized in the 
following simple diagram: 
Patents →Technologies →Products →Product Markets 
In the simplest (and least common) scenario, a single patent covers 
an entire product, which is sold into a discrete economic market. A simple 
toy, or kitchen appliance, might fit this description. But it is far more 
common for the mapping to be more complex. In the auto industry, 
consumer electronics, software (including software platforms), and many 
other industries, patents cover individual components of technologies. 
These technologies are aggregated into products which are sold in the 
market. A typical—and important—example is two-sided platforms, such 
as Amazon, and social media, such as Facebook. The following Figure 
illustrates the patent-to-market mapping for these industries: 
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Figure 4: Mapping Patents into Product Markets 
In this Figure, the little gears (representing technologies) on the left 
are covered by patents, sometimes more than one. The implicit point is 
that patents are not the same as technologies. And it is technologies that 
make up the inputs into Big Platform products or services, such as the 
Facebook platform or the Amazon marketplace. 
I emphasize this feature of technology transactions—the acquisition 
of a new capability, attributable to the innovator—to distinguish it from a 
transaction concerned solely with legal liability. In such a purely legal 
transaction, the only new asset acquired by the buyer is a legal right, in 
the form of one or more patent rights. In the typical case where such 
transactions are concerned, the buyer does not learn about new 
technology, or acquire any new technical capabilities. It buys patents to 
protect itself from future patent infringement lawsuits or to possibly sue 
competitors in patent infringement suits of its own. The transaction 
neither effectuates nor memorializes the transfer of any innovation or new 
capability; it is a pure transfer of legal rights, and nothing more. 
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There is some dispute among patent specialists about the relative 
volume of the two transaction types.27 Some findings seem to show that 
much patent litigation has little to do with capability enhancement; the 
classic study shows that accused patent infringers are almost never proven 
to have copied any technology from the patent owner. Because defendants 
in infringement cases are (the study concludes) independent inventors, 
patents represent not new capabilities but simply a “tax on innovation.” 
Professor Colleen Chien, in a more recent study, however, disagrees.28 
Professor Chien shows that in the important field of software technology, 
many of the license agreements she studied involve the actual transfer of 
computer code, know-how, and associated technical information.29 
C. More on Ex Post Market-Making
A diagram like Figure 4 is misleading. It shows a simple, logical
relationship between inputs and outputs: patents comprise technologies, 
which go into products (such as Facebook and Amazon software/user 
interfaces), which are sold to consumers (or used to sell things to 
consumers, including advertising and digital content). The Figure implies 
that each unique patented invention clearly originates with a single entity. 
Then each entity transfers rights over the invention to other entities, who 
assemble technologies. Technology creators in turn sell what they make 
to product companies, who market products to consumers. Nice, simple, 
clean and logical. 
The problem is that the inputs are both intangible, and in some sense, 
elusive. Each one is often contested. The technologies that go into 
products are, in reality, developed by multiple people and companies; 
different versions and variations originate with many people and 
organizations at roughly the same time. Patented inventions are even more 
complex. Patents take a long time to issue after being filed. There may be 
multiple patents pending on multiple inventions that help to constitute a 
single technology. The landscape of patent rights—who invented what, at 
what time, and who owns what—is worked out on a different timescale 
than the one that determines technology success and product winners. Put 
27. See, e.g., Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015) (finding that very little technology transfer accompanies 
most patent lawsuit settlement/licensing deals). 
28. Colleen V. Chien, Software Patents As A Currency, Not Tax, on Innovation, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1669 (2016). 
29. Id. (“[T]he majority of material software licenses reported by public companies to the SEC 
from 2000-2015 (N=245) support true technology transfer,” based on a study of the terms of these 
reported licensing agreements). 
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simply, technologies emerge first. They are incorporated into products 
with little or no attention to the patent landscape—there is no time for that. 
Consumers vote with their feet (or eyeballs), and a product winner 
emerges. Only well after that happens do the relevant patents issue. And 
only then does the patent landscape start to take shape. Just as product 
winners are becoming ensconced in their markets, the many failed product 
companies may be getting some clarity on their patent situation. 
This retroactive (and expensive)30 market-making is inherently 
inefficient, yet it seems to be the only way that the patent system’s 
timescale can be reconciled with the much more rapid timescale of 
product competition in platform markets. Ex post, retroactive market 
reconstruction seems to be an inevitable feature of the patent system as 
applied to these rapid-fire innovative industries. 
The timeline for this kind of market-making is shown in the 
following Figure. In it, A invents a new technology which it then patents. 
During the same period when A is patenting, B is assembling many 
different components into what will become a product—think here of a 
platform software product, such as Facebook or Amazon or Uber. Think 
of the components as the many technological modules that make up the 
software product: instant messaging, sending and receiving graphics files, 
storage and search capabilities, etc. In the Figure, one part of one 
component that goes into B’s product is the technology that A invented.31 
The point is to see that A’s invention was incorporated into B’s product—
along with many other technologies that comprise all the technologies 
inside the product. 
30. Particularly when the market-making occurs primarily through patent litigation and not
private dealmaking. 
31. Whether B independently created this component, or copied it directly from A, or was
subtly influenced by A’s contribution in its own work, does not matter from the point of view of 
patent law; adopting a patented invention leads to patent infringement liability in any of these cases. 
As you might guess, there is controversy over this aspect of patent law. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 
25, at 1 (summarizing conflicting views). For my part, the difficulty of proving direct copying, 
together with the many possible avenues by which contributions from the A’s of the world make their 
way into the products sold by the B’s of the world, justify the rule that patent owners need not prove 
direct copying as a condition to receiving compensation for infringement. But many disagree. 
Compare Merges, supra note 25, at 6–7, with Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The 
Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002). In one study, 
direct copying was found to have been proven in only 1.76% of a sample of reported patent 
infringement decisions. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. 
L. REV. 1421 (2009). For some context on this study and its findings, see Merges, supra note 25, at 
7–8. 
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Figure 5: A’s Invention and B’s Product 
The particular scenario captured here shows the patent owning 
company, A, giving up on the product market before being compensated 
by B—who is a winner in the product market. This is a common situation, 
but ex post markets are needed even when A stays in the product market 
to compete with B. 
1. Ex Post Markets as Quasi-Historical Reconstruction
It is commonplace to assume that rapid product innovation cycles are
a feature of the twenty-first century economy, and that in some idealized 
past a statelier progression of products from idea to marketplace better fit 
the inherent timescale of the patent system.32 But that’s wrong. This 
32. See, e.g., Hricik, supra note 22, at 458: 
After examining the available data as to whether these legal changes have already
significantly altered the incentive to patent, the Article turns to the second force that
reduces the benefit of the coercive power of patents: the fact that a greater number of
products have shorter life cycles. Because patents take twenty-four months to issue, and
the coercive power of a patent can only be utilized once it issues, the pace of change means 
that fewer patents will exist in time for their coercive power to be meaningfully applied.
Further, that rapid pace of innovation has already created 3D printing, a technology that
25
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dynamic has been going on for over a hundred years. The pattern of 
innovate first, sort out the patent situation later began at least as early as 
the late 19th century. It was the defining feature of the race to perfect 
telephony, the apotheosis of Alexander Graham Bell, and the construction 
of the monolithic Bell telephone system.33 It was integral to the folk 
history of Thomas Edison and the secular gospel of the lightbulb-
invention narrative. Court decisions contributed to the careful historical 
reconstructions of chaotic early invention contests in other industries as 
well, including semiconductors and lasers.34 This is a traditional and 
normal function of the patent system. The imposition of ex post quasi-
markets for key inputs is a role long assigned to the patent system. 
Historians and others have recognized this ex post reconstruction as 
the origin of “great inventor” narratives. And social constructionists have 
had their day critiquing these narratives.35 But as historian Kara Swanson 
permits rapid and dispersed copying of new products, which further reduces the coercive 
benefit of patent rights. 
33. Christopher Beauchamp, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE
PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2015). 
34. See Nick Taylor, LASER: THE INVENTOR, THE NOBEL LAUREATE, AND THE THIRTY-YEAR 
PATENT WAR (2000); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, PATENT LITIGATION IN THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR 
INDUSTRY, IN PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. 
Merrill, eds. 2003). 
35. Briefly, the “social construction of technology” school of thought holds that social actors
and context determine which technologies become dominant; how those technologies are designed; 
and who gets to control and receive credit for them. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 
(Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes & Trevor J. Pinch, eds., 1987). This school of thought arose in 
large part as a response and critique of “technological determinism,” which holds that society is 
shaped by the technologies that it spawns, and that (roughly speaking) society follows from 
technology, as opposed to determining or defining it. See, e.g.,  DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? 
THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM (Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx, eds., 1994). On 
how this relates to patent law and history, see Kara W. Swanson, “Great Men,” Law, and the Social 
Construction of Technology, 43 L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1093 (2018). For a hint of what a full-blown 
social constructivist might say about patent law’s role in establishing credit, profit relations, and the 
basic structure of an industry based on a new technology, consider the words of historian Christopher 
Beauchamp (himself not a full-bodied, unreconstructed constructivist) regarding the patent litigation 
over invention of the telephone: 
The lawyers [for Bell] have exerted a powerful grip on historical memory. Today we may 
take for granted that the telephone originated with a single man, that it consisted essentially 
of a single invention, and that it represented a sharp technological break with the prior art. 
But for Bell and his legal representatives these were bold arguments, deliberately and 
consciously made in pursuit of a patent that would control the telephone business. In the 
courts of the day, and in the judgment of posterity, those arguments succeeded in 
spectacular fashion. In that sense, it was the lawyers, as much as anyone else, who invented 
the telephone. 
Beauchamp, supra note 31, at 5. Despite the suggestion that legal reconstruction was a product of 
pure social forces, Beauchamp says later in his book that “the role of patents can be surprisingly hard 
to pinpoint.” Id. at 165. 
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has recognized, the ex post reconstructions mediated by patent law serve 
not only to canonize the great, but to resolve real-world disputes—to end 
the argument, as it were. As she says in regard to the famous Bell 
telephone patent priority/infringement dispute over who invented the 
building block technologies underlying the telephone: 
Bell’s legal victories, for example, and his status as inventor of the 
telephone, are not so much a failure or hoax, a myth designed to 
obfuscate, cheat other participants in invention out of credit, or cast a 
rosy glow on a past of independent craftsmen (although the truth 
produced in a courtroom may serve all these roles), but rather can be 
seen as the law working, if not perfectly, at least as many observers have 
described it. The law is functioning as we have designed it to function, 
to create a dominant story, and thereby end a dispute. Great men of 
invention are, perhaps, a necessary, or perhaps, at least an inevitable and 
not undesirable by-product of the legal system.36 
As with great pioneers, so with contributors who paved the way for 
an industry to develop. The patent system has long performed the function 
of reconstructing what happened in the early days of a technology. In this 
respect, it has a dual role: it sorts out the (recent) past, and sets the terms 
for exchange in the future, until the patents at issue expire. The studies of 
patent battles involving historically significant inventions highlight the 
way patent law engages in historical reconstruction. Though most of the 
patent licensing and litigation I am talking about in this Article is not 
nearly as important as the early fights over Bell or Edison inventions, the 
process of reconstruction that historians have studied is the same. It goes 
on, in other words, in hundreds of prosaic cases, which are too minor for 
historians to study later, but which are of deep interest and concern to the 
parties involved. 
When the argument is ended, or put off for another day, the market 
begins. Because businesspeople know that the patent system will do its 
best to sort things out later, they can charge ahead with the essential tasks 
of trying to develop, combine, and market the right bundle of 
technologies, and in the process, they hope, win the competition for the 
best product. When the legal process catches up to the situation, by sorting 
out the patent positions of the early contributors, it can end up rewarding 
contributors in a number of different scenarios. 
For competitors that wind up with stable market shares, the ex post 
market can compensate an early contributor for laying the groundwork for 
the entire industry. A technological pioneer with less than dominant 
36. Swanson, supra note 33, at 10. 
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market share can receive “back payments” that it is not likely to make 
through product sales in a competitive market. Such was the case in the 
polypropylene industry. Crucial early contributions by researchers at 
Philips Petroleum were recognized long after the fact.37 By the time the 
patent was awarded, the industry had settled down into a highly 
competitive mature or commodity phase. The royalty payments to Phillips 
recognized its early contributions, bringing an additional source of profit 
over and above the profit from the highly competitive market for 
polypropylene products. 
Paice is a good example. This company was founded by an 
independent automotive engineer named Alex Severinsky.38 He was one 
of the pioneers in hybrid auto engine technology. Many contemporary 
hybrid engines build on his award-winning technology.39 Beginning with 
Toyota in 2007, Paice has successfully asserted several of its early patents 
against makers of hybrid autos,40 which also includes Hyundai and Kia 
Motors.41 In an overview of auto industry patent litigation, Paice is listed 
as a “supplier-competitor,” rather than in the separate category of “patent 
37. The original research began in the early 1950s, and after a very long patent interference, or 
priority contest (a feature of patent law under the 1952 Act which is slowly fading away under the 
post-2011 law), the patent was awarded to Phillips Petroleum in 1980. See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 
v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370 (1980), aff’d, 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981). An interesting
feature of the case is that inventors for one of the losing parties, Montedison, had won a Nobel Prize
in chemistry for discovery of polypropylene. The careful reconstruction of early research in the field 
might be said to call that Prize into doubt. See American Chemical Society, Division of the History
of Chemistry and The Office of Communications, Discovery of Polypropylene and the Development 
of a New High-Density Polyethylene, at 3, https://www.acs.org/content/dam/acsorg/
education/whatischemistry/landmarks/polypropylene/discovery-of-polypropylene-and-
development-of-high-density-polyethylene-commemorative-booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/X33F-
XN66] (“It was believed for many years that Prof. Ziegler and Italian scientist Giulio Natta were
responsible for the discovery, because they had been the first to publish their findings—and because 
they had received the Nobel Prize for their work on these polymers. In 1983, an appellate court ruled 
that the patent did indeed belong to J. Paul Hogan, Robert L. Banks, and the Phillips Petroleum
Company.” 
38. Alex Severinsky, PAICE, http://www.paicehybrid.com/about/alex-severinsky/ [https://
perma.cc/ATP7-Z5YS].  
39. Id.
40. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming finding
of patent infringement of Paice patents). See also Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 
620 (E.D. Tex. 2009), dismissed, 455 F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (adjusting patent damages, in the 
form of a royalty rate, as determined by district court). 
41. Bill Robinson, The Future of High Tech Patent Litigation in the Auto Industry, 
AUTOMOTIVE WORLD, AUTO INDUSTRY LAW BLOG (April 26, 2017), 
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2017/05/the-future-of-high-tech-patent-litigation-in-
the-a [https://perma.cc/D7XW-WWJT].  
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troll.”42 This is a company based on real technology, which was patented. 
In the race to develop and commercialize hybrid drive trains, Severinsky 
and his company made real contributions. But it took patent litigation in 
the ex post period for Paice to receive its deserved compensation. 
2. The Importance of Patents for Companies Not in Product
Markets
For two types of companies, patents are especially important. 
Component suppliers, such as Paice, may have difficulty recouping the 
value of their research. Manufacturers such as auto companies may well 
undervalue the contributions of outsiders. Research shows that in this 
situation, patents can be especially important to the survival of specialist 
component suppliers such as Paice.43 Without patent protection, hybrid 
technology can be easily absorbed into the large auto companies, leaving 
companies like Paice with a very limited future. 
The other scenario where patents are important is the case of a failed 
product company. An early entrant may contribute critical technology in 
the early days of an industry yet lose in the “product wars.” Without 
manufacturing, distribution, and independent branding, such a company 
has no form of compensation for its contributions other than patents. It is 
foreclosed from all product-related strategies for recouping costs and 
making profits. The only way its early contributions will be recognized is 
through patent litigation. Patents are thus essential to eventual product 
market “losers” such as Blackberry in the mobile phone market. In the 
same way the patent system canonizes the early technological pioneers 
42. Id. (In a list of recent auto industry patent cases, classifying Paice litigation as one of the
“supplier-competitor cases” rather than one of the “patent troll cases”). 
43. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets, and the Value of
Intangible Assets (Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327663 [https://perma.cc/JDF8-8C7K].  
Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property As A Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 857 
(2011) (“Patents enable innovators to make efficient selections of firm scope by transacting with least-
cost suppliers of commercialization inputs.”); Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply 
Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 470–72 (2004). A 
more general version of this theory says that patents are important for all new market entrants, whether 
they sell components or pursue a different business strategy. New entrants do not have the benefit of 
economies of scale, or “first-mover” advantages, or any other way to leverage the power or 
incumbency and large scale as ways to recoup R&D investments. New entrants must therefore lean 
heavily on patent protection – making patents especially important as an incentive for them. Because 
potential entrants have access to a much more limited and less effective set of alternative appropriation 
devices, patents may offer significantly greater marginal value as a protection device. See Jonathan 
M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1282 (2004).
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such as Edison or Bell, Blackberry’s inventors may be recognized in 
retrospect for their early contributions. 
Put differently, though the economic market may be “winner take 
all,” patent law works differently. By reconstructing the technological 
contributions to the ultimate winning product, it ensures that in some cases 
at least, an early innovator might be rewarded even though that innovator 
did not ultimately win in the product market. The patent system can form 
an ex post market that allows for a result we might call “loser takes some.” 
Because today’s product “losers” were yesterday’s (and perhaps 
tomorrow’s) technological innovators, this is an important though 
submerged aspect of the innovative ecosystem. 
3. Summary: Formation of Ex Post Markets
When a court assigns liability for patent infringement well after the
defendant has adopted the technology in question, it is in effect imposing 
a transaction on the patent owner and adopter/infringer. We can envision 
this ex post market-making as follows: 
Figure 6: Patent Liability as Ex Post Market-Making 
This court-imposed deal is retroactive in the sense that liability is 
assigned (and compensation calculated) for past infringement. Going 
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forward, after the infringement suit, there are several possibilities. The 
product company B can make a deal for future licensing of A’s patent 
(perhaps, for example, projecting the court-awarded damages into the 
future, as a royalty payment); it can design around the patented technology 
so as to avoid future infringement; or, if B chooses to simply honor an 
injunction awarded to A, B might simply remove the infringing  
technology from its product altogether. These options are represented in 
the next Figure. 
Figure 7: B’s Post-Litigation Options 
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IV. EX POST MARKETS VS. RENT-SEEKING: POLICING THE TROLL LINE
I have described a viable role for patent litigation—ex post market-
making. I recognize that for my account to hold true, I am up against 
several well-entrenched ideas. First is that very little litigation adds any 
value from the perspective of businesspeople. This is a general view, but 
it runs deep, I think. Next is a close corollary: the idea that patent litigation 
in particular adds very little economic value. This begins with the general 
aversion to litigation that I described, but goes beyond. It is a view that 
has been heavily influenced by the patent troll wars and the associated 
calls for patent reform. For me to carry my case, I would have to show 
that the patent system has been purged of most of the defects that sustained 
the troll wars. And that what is left, the general and well-known costs of 
litigation, is outweighed by the benefits of market-making. That’s a big 
burden. What I can do for a start is briefly list the reforms from recent 
years that seem to be at least reducing the incidence of troll litigation. In 
the process, I will describe how the post-reform patent system works to 
discourage rent-seeking litigation (troll cases) and thus encourage 
positive, value-adding litigation. I will also throw in some suggestions as 
to how the system might be fine-tuned even more to make it more 
effective at its primary value-adding function: constructing ex post patent 
markets. After that I can at least briefly summarize the remaining costs 
and benefits of litigation—the net benefit story as it stands in the post-
reform era. 
To begin, observe that an ex post market for a true innovation follows 
this pattern, in the paradigmatic case of a patented component: 
Component Innovation & Compensation 
1. A innovates with respect to some feature of technology X.
2. B produces a successful product, selling a product
incorporating technology X.
3. A seeks compensation for its contribution to the X
technology that B sells as part of its winning product.
This comes very close to the following scenario: 
Rent-Seeking Litigation 
1. B innovates and wins the product market competition.
2. A drafts a clever patent capturing some aspects of B’s
technology, or acquires an extant patent that does the same.
3. A extracts rents from B through patent litigation.
4.
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How do we sort out the innovation scenario from the rent-seeking 
one? We rely on the structure of patent doctrine and the institutions for 
judging patent validity. Between them—when things are working 
properly—patents are kept from: (1) staying in force when they should be 
invalid; (2) covering technologies that they have no right to cover; and (3) 
generating economic returns far out of proportion to the inherent value of 
the patented technology. 
A. Policies to Prevent Rent-Seeking: Policing the “Troll Line”
In the ideal world, patent law polices the boundary between
legitimacy and overstretch, between rewarding innovation and inviting 
rent-seeking. I describe this boundary as the “troll line”—the line that 
separates beneficial from harmful patents and patent enforcement. 
A natural question is: how close is today’s patent system to the ideal 
one, one that properly draws and polices the troll line? Are there reasons 
to be skeptical about the ability of patent law to patrol the boundary 
between useless litigation and appropriate ex post compensation? These 
are quite difficult questions; experienced players on the patent scene 
might have a hard time coming to agreement. My view, however, is that 
although we can always improve the system, patent reform gives us tools 
to effectively police this line. Each of the detailed rules that comprise the 
dense body of patent doctrines plays a part. And many have been the 
subject of patent reform, either from Congress or the courts. 
In the paragraphs that follow, I will briefly survey the main 
procedures and doctrines that come into play when a patent owner seeks 
to enforce it. I look at three issues: (1) how does each procedure or 
doctrine contribute to the proper placement of the troll line, i.e., how does 
each help to separate good patents from bad?; (2) what recent reforms 
have been enacted, and how have these reforms affected the troll line?; 
and (3) are there any doctrinal changes or procedural tweaks that that 
would help to better distinguish troll suits from legitimate enforcement? 
1. Validity Procedures
The first topic is the procedures added to patent law in the America
Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) for post-issuance review of patent validity at 
the Patent Office. These procedures are conducted by the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB), an administrative court. Most important among 
the new procedures is the Inter Partes Review (IPR). As one commentator 
says: 
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[T]he new inter partes review proceeding has been extraordinarily
popular, with over four thousand petitions filed in its first four-and-a-
half years. There are several reasons for this popularity. First, the
proceedings are trial-like. The challenger can make written submissions
and participate in a hearing before the PTAB, an entity created by the
AIA and composed of patent lawyers and former patent examiners.
Second, because of tight timelines imposed by the AIA, inter partes
review concludes quickly, usually taking little more than a year.44
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the IPR, how it has 
changed the dynamics of patent enforcement.45 The most important 
reason is cost—an IPR is usually one-tenth of the cost of district court 
patent litigation46—which in the past was the only effective way to 
invalidate a patent. Litigation costs create leverage for patent owners, 
often leading to settlements. The high cost of invalidation drove the 
economics of much troll litigation.47 For a good number of years, 
commentators said that the US needed an administrative alternative to 
litigation, along the lines of European patent oppositions.48 Now the US 
44. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.  J. 619, 631 (2018). 
45. Patent pros will recognize that IPRs supplanted the short-lived inter partes reexamination
system, which was the forerunner to the IPR. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 931–947 (7th ed. 2017). 
46. Gugliuzza, supra note 42, at 632–33 (footnotes omitted): 
The new administrative proceedings created by the AIA are a direct response to the high
cost and long duration of patent litigation. The House Judiciary Committee report on the
AIA explicitly states that the purpose of the new proceedings is to “provid[e] quick and
cost effective alternatives to litigation.” Survey evidence indicates that inter partes review 
pursued through appeal costs about $350,000—still expensive, but well below the average 
cost of patent litigation in court. 
See also Brian J. Love et. al., Determinants of Patent Quality: Evidence from Inter Partes Review 
Proceedings, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 103–04 (2019) (footnotes omitted). (“USPTO filing fees alone 
for an instituted IPR are $30,500, and median legal fees required to pursue an IPR to a final written 
decision are estimated to be about $250,000.”). Recent survey data show the median cost of full patent 
litigation (through trial) is $2 million for disputes of value between $1 and $10 million, and $3 million 
for disputes of value between $10 million and $25 million. See Samson Vermont, AIPLA Survey of 
Costs of Patent Litigation and Inter Partes Review, PATENTATTORNEY.COM (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.patentattorney.com/aipla-survey-of-costs-of-patent-litigation-and-inter-partes-review/ 
[https://perma.cc/VN5B-TT4W]. 
47. See Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and
Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159 (2008). 
48. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why 
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might 
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004). For information on oppositions, see ROBERT P. MERGES 
& SEAGULL HAIYAN SONG, TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 35‒37 (2018). 
According to a careful review of the data, IPRs and European oppositions are now quite similar in 
terms of case outcomes. See Colleen Chien, Comparative Patent Quality, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 77 
(2018) (“When post-grant challenge outcomes at the EPO and USPTO are compared, the outcomes 
are not statistically distinguishable.”). See also Colleen Chien, Christian Helmers & Alfred Spigarelli, 
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has that, in the form of IPRs.49 As one scholar concluded recently, “inter 
partes review is, as Congress intended, eliminating patents that appear to 
be of relatively low quality.”50 
In general, then, IPRs do a good deal of work in policing the troll 
line.51 But their very effectiveness makes them a target for attack. The 
attacks take advantage of the fairly loose coordination between the Patent 
Office and courts that are a feature of the U.S. patent system. One theory 
that would have eliminated IPRs altogether was rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group 
LLC.52 But the basis of this theory—that patents are property rights, and 
therefore immune from administrative revocation—informs a related 
threat to IPRs: that patent revocation is a constitutional “taking” of 
property, requiring full compensation to the aggrieved patentee/property 
holder. Several forms of mischief are at work here. One is conceptual: an 
Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 817 
(2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2601562 [https://perma.cc/Z99V-
Q35R] (In both European opposition and post-grant U.S. reexamination, about 60% to 65% of 
challenged patents are either amended or rejected, and in 25% to 30% of the cases, all the claims are 
rejected and the patent is revoked.). 
49. On IPRs, see generally ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY
(8th ed., forthcoming 2021). The actual revocation rates for IPRs must be understood as a function of 
the two-step IPR process. A petitioner first asks for an IPR to be “instituted”; then, if the PTAB 
decides one or more claims may be invalid, it proceeds with the actual IPR administrative trial. And 
so: 
The PTAB declines to institute proceedings about 30% of the time, and the parties settle 
roughly one-third of proceedings. So, although the PTAB renders a ruling of invalidity in 
most of its final decisions, less than half of the patent claims that are initially challenged 
reach that stage. Of the 70,060 total claims challenged in inter partes review in the first 
four-and-a-half years of the proceeding’s existence, only 16,688 (24%) were ruled invalid. 
Gugliuzza, supra note 42, at 631 (footnotes omitted). 
50. Love, Miller, & Ambwani, supra note 44, at 68.
51. IPRs are not a perfect substitute for district court invalidations, however. In an IPR, only
novelty and obviousness are considered. And only two categories of prior art may be consulted: 
patents and printed publications. Because there are a wide variety of invalidity grounds other than 
102 and 103, and because there are more types of prior art other than patents and publications, 
litigation is a necessary adjunct. Patent validity proceeds in three stages: initial examination (a quick, 
imperfect first cut), see Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan Marco, What is the Probability of 
Receiving a U.S. Patent?, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 203, 209 (2015) (overall 56% success rate on patent 
applications); IPRs (an adversarial, yet limited, second look); and full-blown district court litigation 
(an expensive and fine-grained analysis). It makes sense in this stepwise process that more obscure 
prior art, which is more expensive to discover, comes into play only in district court litigation. The 
financial stakes are apt to be higher, so a greater expenditure of resources on locating invalidating 
prior art makes sense at this stage. See Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in the District Court, 95 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 838 (2019) (harder to find prior art involving obscure references such as modestly 
distributed publications and evidence of prior use or sale (“activity” prior art) plays a prominent role 
in invalidating patents in district court litigation). 
52. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Corp., 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017). 
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absolutist view of property rights at odds with the nature of patents.53 
Another is more pragmatic: these challenges threaten to undermine the 
efficiency gains that have been made with the creation of IPRs. 
Formalistic talk of constitutional property is all well and good, but it is 
essential that courts do not lose sight of the basic purpose of IPRs. To 
effectively help police the troll line, the PTAB must be free to do its job. 
Another potential problem area with respect to IPRs relates to 
standing. In many cases, a patent challenger has an obvious, palpable 
concern about a competitor’s patent. In such a case, not only can the 
challenger file an IPR; they can also appeal an IPR final decision to the 
Federal Circuit. But where a challenger does not have enough of a direct, 
immediate threat, no such appeal may be available after a challenge that 
fails.54 U.S. federal court standing doctrine blocks it.55 Because it is 
important to open patent challenges as widely as possible, this doctrine 
ought to be interpreted broadly. Otherwise the loss of an appeal right could 
hinder some challengers, which would reduce the benefits of IPRs. 
2. Validity Doctrines
Whether via an IPR or district court litigation, the essential
gatekeepers to the patent system are the primary validity doctrines: subject 
matter, novelty, nonobviousness, enablement/written description, and 
claim definiteness. Patent reform has touched each of these. With the 
53. See Robert P. Merges, What Kind of Rights are Intellectual Property Rights?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4–7 (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds., 
2017). Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (commercial trade secrets can be 
protected by mandated disclosure, under a takings claim). But see Adam Mossoff, Patents as 
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007); Gregory Dolin & Irena D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
719, 720 (2016) (“The way to remedy these [constitutional] failings is for the government either to 
change its procedures or provide just compensation to the patent owners that received patents from 
the PTO before the enactment of the AIA.”); Gregory Dolin, Yes, the PTAB Is Unconstitutional, 17 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 457 (2018). 
54. See JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. LTD., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Patent
challenger has no standing to appeal adverse IPR decision because its engineers’ “declarations do not 
establish that its planned product would create a substantial risk of infringing [any] claims [of the 
challenged] patent or likely lead to charges of infringement . . . .”). But see E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1004‒05 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Patent challenger in an IPR had 
standing to appeal since it showed that it was a competitor of the patentee, and had built a plant that 
was “capable of infringing” the challenged claims, that the patentee had alleged before the Board that 
the challenger had copied the patent, and that further, the patentee had refused to grant the license 
under the relevant patent). 
55. The requirement for federal court jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution
calls for a “case or controversy.” In patent law, this means the patent owner must threaten a potential 
defendant in a concrete, material way. A vague or general concern that a patent might be enforced is 
not enough. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
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exception of novelty, standards have been tightened over the past 10 to 15 
years. The Supreme Court, in particular, has visited almost all of these 
requirements in one case or another. And on every occasion, it has made 
it easier to invalidate patents. Sometimes, much easier. A quick review 
will show why these primary validity doctrines have become stalwart 
sentinels guarding the integrity of the troll line. 
The Supreme Court has made it much easier to very quickly dispense 
with a patent for failing to cover an invention that falls within patent law’s 
established subject matter categories: processes, machines, manufactures, 
and compositions of matter.  This usually happens when a patent claims 
something at such a high level of generality that it is overly conceptual 
and broad; or when something already exists in nature and is claimed in 
its basic form, instead of as part of a larger invention that uses the natural 
thing to produce a specific effect.56 
Despite criticism of the logic and substance of these § 101 decisions, 
they have undoubtedly added a powerful new deterrent along the troll line. 
The chief contribution of the new § 101 case law is that it encourages what 
might be called a “quick-look” on patent validity. Procedurally, courts 
deploy § 101 at the very outset of litigation. Of all the ways to invalidate 
a patent, § 101 has come to have one chief virtue: it’s the cheapest. As one 
experienced observer says, 
[T]he number of pleadings-stage dismissals on eligibility grounds has
dramatically increased since the beginning of the Supreme Court’s
recent string of decisions. Although district courts sometimes grant
motions to dismiss without prejudice, . . . most of those dismissals are
with prejudice—they are, in other words, the final word on patent
validity as far as the district court is concerned.57
56. John M. Golden, Remedies and Procedure: Patent Law’s Continuing Frontiers, 17 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 290, 292 (2018) (footnotes omitted) (“The [Supreme] Court has made . . . 
dramatic interventions on questions of subject-matter eligibility—i.e., the types of things, such as 
genetic sequences or computer programs—that may be patented.”). Golden points out, however, that 
“[w]hile the Court’s decisions relating to the patentability of genetic sequences and medical 
diagnostic methods have been disruptive for substantial industry sectors, they have not quashed 
patenting in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology and appear to have left patenting in other fields of 
technology largely untouched.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
57. Gugliuzza, supra note 42, at 653. Gugliuzza goes on to say: 
[S]ummary judgment in discovery-intensive patent cases is much more expensive than a
motion to dismiss. Thus, one arguably coherent policy justification for the eligibility
requirement is that, as a “coarse-grained filter” for patentability, it provides a means for
quickly and cheaply wiping out patents that are so likely to be invalidated under other
requirements of patentability that discovery is not warranted. 
Gugliuzza, supra note 42, at 655 (footnotes omitted), citing John M. Golden, Patentable Subject 
Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1058 (2011). For an argument that the Patent 
37
Merges: Patent Litigation as Ex Post Market-Making
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
592 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:555 
But § 101 does not impact all types of patents equally. Though 
software patents are a favorite of troll plaintiffs,58 all manner of patents 
lend themselves to the potential for litigation aimed at rent-seeking. Other 
validity requirements must then come into play to separate valuable 
patents from the rest. This is where recent changes to the nonobviousness 
requirement, § 103, come into play.59 
a. Nonobviousness
In 2007, the Supreme Court raised the standard of nonobviousness,60 
making it more difficult to acquire a patent at the Patent Office and defend 
its validity later. This decision makes it easier to prove that a combination 
of prior art references renders an invention obvious, i.e., unpatentable. 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. also adopted what many feel is the proper 
way of considering whether a new invention is trivial or significant—a 
focus on the state of predictability or uncertainty just prior to creation of 
Office should have more say in setting § 101 standards for the courts see Melissa F. Wasserman, The 
Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 
(2013). One renowned patent scholar points out that court challenges under § 101 are small in number 
compared to the total number of patent applications the Patent Office deals with. See Arti K. Rai, 
Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 516 
(2013): 
Regardless of whether courts can successfully use the [101] test within the relatively small 
number of cases they have to adjudicate, a sophisticated approach to Section 101 is 
unlikely to be a useful tool in the mine run of cases that [patent] examiners must address 
in an average time allotment of about twenty to forty hours [per patent application, in the 
Patent Office]. Although a crude and underinclusive . . . [version of the 101] test should 
have some utility, patentable subject matter doctrine has limited potential at the initial 
examination stage. 
58. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE 
PATENT QUALITY, August, 2013, https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6NV6-C5T7], at p. 22, Figure 6 (over 90% of “patent monetization entity” (often, troll) litigation 
involves software patents). See also Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex 
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 304–05 (2010) 
(describing rise of software patents, and subsequent growth in litigation). 
59. Novelty is also an important screening doctrine, but the content of the novelty requirement 
has been stable for many years. The only recent development of note did not raise the novelty 
standard, it only maintained the status quo. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 
139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (maintaining and carrying over pre-2011 case law on the definition of prior art 
categories in use since the 19th century); cf. Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023 (2012) (advocating for this approach). 
60. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/3
2020] PATENT LITIGATION AS EX POST MARKET-MAKING 593 
the new invention.61 The changed standard is evident from the post-KSR 
case law: 
The data indicate that prior to KSR, when the Federal Circuit reached a 
final determination on the question of obviousness, the court concluded 
that the patent was obvious 43% of the time in appeals arising from the 
district courts and [the International Trade Commission, an alternative 
patent enforcement forum for imported products]. After KSR, the court 
reached a conclusion of “obvious” in appeals arising from these 
tribunals 57% of the time. This difference is statistically significant; that 
is, at the most commonly accepted level of statistical significance p < 
.05, one can conclude that it is not due to random chance alone.62 
Because the Federal Circuit decides appeals from the Patent Office 
as well, the same pattern is observed with respect to the validity of patent 
applications under § 103: 
Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit concluded that the subject matter of 
these appeals was obvious 83% of the time; after KSR, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that they were obvious 96% of the time. During the 
five years following KSR, the Federal Circuit concluded that the patent 
was obvious in all but four appeals arising from the Patent Office in 
which it reached a final determination on the issue of obviousness.63 
61. Id. at 417 (“If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation [of the prior 
art], § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). See generally Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the 
Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992). 
62. Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 738 (2013) (footnote omitted). See also Golden, supra note 54, 
at 291–92 (“The United States Supreme Court [in KSR] appears to have caused an uptick in the 
stringency of patent law’s demand that an invention be nonobvious in order to be patentable.”); 
Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 369 (2011). 
63. Rantanen, supra note 60, at 738. See also Calvin M. Brien, An Empirical Analysis of Patent 
Validity in Inter Partes Reviews Through the Lens of KSR, 46 AIPLA Q.J. 413, 435 (2018) (showing 
that pre-KSR patents were subject to a lower and less stringent standard of nonobviousness) (footnotes 
omitted): 
In the . . . data set [covering PTAB decisions whether to institute an IPR], 26.7% of the 
pre-KSR patents survived obviousness scrutiny at the institution stage, while 37.8% of the 
post-KSR patents survived such scrutiny. This supports the hypothesis that pre-KSR 
patents should survive obviousness challenges less often than post-KSR patents. Regarding 
the final written decision data, although a higher percentage of post-KSR patents survived 
IPR obviousness challenges, the difference between these percentages is low: 1.1% 
(85.2% minus 84.1%). This low percentage difference contrasts with the much higher 
percentage difference seen in the institution decision data: 11.1% (73.3% minus 62.2%). 
The insignificant difference between the validity percentages for pre-KSR and post-KSR 
patents after institution is predictable because the institution decision is a patentability 
determination. In other words, after institution and long before a final decision is made, 
the PTAB has already made a determination that the challenged patent is likely invalid. 
39
Merges: Patent Litigation as Ex Post Market-Making
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
594 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:555 
b. Disclosure Doctrines
In what might be called the early years of the Troll Wars, the 
purchase of low-quality patents, whose sole function was rent extraction, 
gave patents and patent litigation a bad name among people who care 
about real innovation.64 One aspect of patent law that makes this strategy 
possible is that sometimes patents claim more than they realistically teach, 
or disclose. It is the job of disclosure-related doctrines to defeat this 
strategy, but those doctrines needed some tightening to properly respond 
to the troll problem. 
Three inter-related doctrines are named in § 112 of the Patent Act: 
enablement, written description, and claim definiteness. Though written 
description has expanded greatly in recent years, it produces few 
invalidations that would not have occurred before. This is because it 
largely duplicates the traditional work of the enablement doctrine. In a 
recent study of patent invalidity cases, covering the period from 2011 until 
mid-2017 (a total of 1,542 patent validity determinations), patent 
invalidations due to failure to meet the written description requirement 
totaled 59, while those invalidated due to enablement totaled 43.65 But 
there is little to separate them, and like the formative case in this area, it 
seems many if not most decided under one provision could as equally have 
been decided under the other.66 In any event, detailed empirical data show 
that software patents—again, a favorite of troll plaintiffs—are the most 
frequently invalidated patents under enablement and description.67 These 
Therefore, the final outcome of an IPR is highly predictable after institution, regardless of 
what obviousness law (i.e., pre-KSR or post-KSR) was applied during original 
examination. 
64. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent 
Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1587 (2009). 
65. See Yelderman, supra note 51, at 19. 
66. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
67. See John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent
Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 647–48 (2016) (footnotes omitted): 
On enablement, patents employing the oldest technology of all, mechanics, scored higher 
[on validity scores] than those in any other primary technology area, and software scored 
the lowest. In the software area, it may come as a surprise that the non-business-method 
software patents were more likely to be invalidated than those covering business models 
and techniques. Unlike the rest of the software class, business methods were ranked almost 
as high as biotech and above optics in their likelihood to survive scrutiny. 
On written description, patents in the electrical- and mechanical-technology areas 
switched places, the former being the most likely to withstand challenges. The mean 
written-description outcome for software business methods was the worst mean outcome 
for any technology on any § 112 issue, meaning that software-business-method patents 
were very likely to be invalidated for lack of written description. Non-business-method 
software and software as a whole also fared poorly on written description. 
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requirements under § 112 do a fair amount of the work of weeding out the 
over-broad patents often associated with troll litigation. 
The indefiniteness requirement is even more helpful. There is little 
doubt that this test has been tightened in recent years. The Supreme Court 
itself did much of the work, by eliminating a quite forgiving test 
developed by the Federal Circuit and substituting a more demanding 
standard.68 Open-ended claim language that permitted patents to read on 
or cover a wide array of embodiments was much beloved by patent trolls: 
it gave them the opportunity to purchase a broad patent issued in earlier 
times and assert it against later-emerging technologies. For obvious 
reasons, this facilitated a good bit of rent-seeking. The Supreme Court’s 
new test has had the expected result: more patents are being invalidated 
these days.69 
In one specific field, however, the Federal Circuit, not the Supreme 
Court, gets credit for requiring more definite claims. Broad invention 
elements claimed in “means plus function” format are permissible in any 
field but seem to be very popular in software patents. The Federal Circuit 
has invalidated a number of software claims having means plus function 
elements. Patent drafters had been trying to claim broadly by reciting such 
an element but had, in many cases, failed to provide detailed algorithms, 
pseudo-code, or other structural guidance in the patent specification. 
Reciting a vague “black box” software component is not enough to make 
a means plus function claim definite under the Patent Act.70 The bottom 
68. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
69. See Christa J. Laser, A Definite Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An Empirical Study of
Definiteness Cases of the Past Decade with A Focus on the Federal Circuit and the Insolubly 
Ambiguous Standard, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25, 32 (2010) (“54.55% of all final Federal 
Circuit claim indefiniteness cases [in the study] found claims definite and 45.45% of final cases found 
claims indefinite.”). 
70. See, e.g., Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“means for controlling” element indefinite in light of specification that simply shows a vague 
software flow chart that includes a “control means” component); Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, 
Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“means for assigning” a specified role for users of a 
software platform, which controls the level of access the system grants to each user, is indefinite in 
light of flowchart showing a vague “access control means” component). Cf. Allison & Ouellette, 
supra note 65, at 655–56 (footnote omitted) (arguing that their case data show that means plus 
function claims fare poorly across all fields): 
[A] claim with an MPF [means plus function] element was far more likely to succumb to
an indefiniteness challenge . . . One might think that this result is driven by recent
software-patent cases . . . , which embraced the use of indefiniteness to invalidate
overbroad MPF software claims. However, . . . we found the same negative and highly
significant coefficients on the MPF variable. We thus think this is not [a software]-specific 
result. 
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line is that open-ended software claims that cover a broad function are 
very often invalidated—which takes away a favorite tool of patent trolls.71 
Overall, the data present a unified picture. The requirements of § 112, 
whose purpose is to make sure that patent claims are commensurate with 
the overall contribution the invention makes, help to cut down 
considerably on rent-seeking litigation. As one study put it: 
Operating companies’ success rates in adjudicated cases is more than 
twice as high as NPEs: operating companies won definitive rulings 
30.6% of the time, compared to only 14.4% for NPEs. That difference 
is statistically significant at a high level of confidence. In fact, NPEs did 
worse than operating companies on most of the outcomes represented in 
our dataset. . . . [W]e found statistically significant results for: invalidity 
based on claim indefiniteness (found 10.5% of the time it was ruled upon 
against operating companies, but 31.7% of the time against NPEs), [and] 
invalidity based on inadequate disclosure (found 16.8% of the time it 
was ruled upon against operating companies, but 75% of the time against 
NPEs) . . . .72 
3. Infringement Doctrines
Validity doctrines, as we just saw, are important in cutting back on
enforcement for non-innovative and overbroad patented inventions. A 
second set of doctrinal changes has also reined in rent-seeking. Doctrinal 
changes over the past 10 to 15 years have made it less likely that a firm, 
which in fact contributed very little, can win an infringement suit by 
asserting that its patents claims cover or “read on” profitable products sold 
by others. Even if a patent survives the many validity challenges available 
to a defendant, the patent owner must still prove infringement. This can 
be difficult—even more difficult than defending validity. Several 
doctrines within the law of infringement contribute to this difficulty. 
First is the “doctrine of equivalents,” which in the past was used to 
stretch patent claims beyond their literal wording when courts thought that 
was the fair thing to do. Though this doctrine lives on in principle, it is 
rarely used these days; this makes patents claims narrower on average 
71. Allison & Ouellette, supra note 65, at 647–48 (“[P]atents in the mechanical-, electrical-, 
chemistry-, biotechnology-, and optics-technology fields were most likely to withstand claim-
indefiniteness challenges, with software having fared less well, and software’s business-method 
subset being the most likely to be invalidated.”). On patent trolls’ preference to assert software 
patents, see John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Non-Practicing 
Entities Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 263 (2017). (“22.8% of operating company 
cases litigated to judgment involved software patents, while a whopping 65.9% of NPE [non-
practicing entity, i.e., troll] suits did.”). 
72. Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 69, at 269. 
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than they used to be.73 Second, at least in some cases, the Federal Circuit 
has shown some sensitivity to the use of patent claim interpretation as an 
instrument of rent-seeking. In a series of cases, it has refused to extend a 
claim obviously drafted to capture “generation 1” technology to include 
“generation 2” or “generation 3” of the same technology.74 This takes 
dead aim at rent-seeking strategies: it is almost a tautology that using 
generation 1 teachings to capture the value of generation 2 and 3 
represents an attempt to extract wealth that was not truly earned.75 
Empirical data show the difficulties in proving infringement, 
especially in the (troll-heavy) area of software patents. One study says: 
[A]cross all technologies, the chance of a patent being held not infringed 
was significantly higher than the chance of it being held invalid. That
was true in every technology area, but the result was particularly striking 
in the optics and software industries, in which more than two-thirds of
all the cases we observed included a finding of noninfringement.
Overall, there were almost twice as many noninfringement rulings (348)
as invalidity rulings (188). The difference in infringement and validity
rates in software may shed some light on debates about software. . . . [I]t
73. See, e.g., Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., 754 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (owner of
patent claiming use of high level programming with microcontroller failed to establish infringement 
under doctrine of equivalents). See generally John Allison and Mark Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise 
of the Doctrine of Equivalents 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007). But see Dennis Crouch, Doctrine of 
Equivalents: On the Rise Again, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 21, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/
patent/2013/02/doctrine-of-equivalents-on-the-rise.html [https://perma.cc/HS29-J7HG]. See 
generally Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 954 (2015) 
(arguing that the survival of the doctrine of equivalents proves the malleability of patents over time). 
74. This is a pattern I have observed, as opposed to a formal rule or doctrine. See, e.g., On
Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (US Patent 
5,465,213, drafted in 1990 to cover on-demand printing of single copies of books in special kiosks 
installed in bookstores, did not cover large-scale remote printing companies that prints books on 
demand in response to customer orders, such as  Amazon.com (one of the defendants). “[T]he focus 
of the [plaintiff’s] patent is immediate single-copy printing and binding initiated by the customer and 
conducted at the customer’s site. The [patent claim at issue] . . . cannot eliminate these constraints in 
order to embrace the remote large-scale production of books for publishers and retailers.”); Walker 
Dig., LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV 09-7514 PSG PJWX, 2011 WL 61618 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011), 
aff’d, 484 F. App’x 496 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s patent 
claiming the ability to prepare a browser search that runs “in the background” while a user operates a 
software program (such as Microsoft Word) “in the foreground”; patent application filed in 1998 
envisioned preparation and launch of search term completely within a self-contained and separate 
browser program, while later software permits browser search preparation in a program separate from 
but tightly integrated with the browser, such as in contemporary versions of Microsoft Office). 
75. Cf. Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: 
A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 738 (2010) (“[T]he 
meaning of scientific and technical terms can change significantly during the life span of a patent. In 
the field of digital technology, for example, change can occur unbelievably rapidly given the 
exponential rate of advance in computer technology. Litigation over patent claims can occur multiple 
technological generations after the patent claim term was drafted.”). 
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may be that software patent holders are overasserting their patents in 
litigation, rather than overclaiming in the claim-drafting sense.76 
Infringement, then, presents a significant set of issues on the border 
between beneficial patents and those that would merely extract wealth 
without adding anything of economic value.77 
4. Remedies
Some companies litigate patents as part of broader strategic
competition (such as the Apple-Samsung mobile phone “wars”). Other 
companies use patents to police market entry, prevent competition from 
forming, or other corporate goals. But for trolls, litigation is not a tactic, 
it is a business model. For these patent owners, the remedies available in 
litigation (and the settlements dictated by those remedies) are the entire 
point of the game. Companies that make and sell goods and products—
the usual targets of troll litigation—understood this early on. So, it is no 
surprise that one of the first major issues raised in troll-related patent 
reform was the law of remedies. 
The major reform blow came in 2006 with the eBay case.78 This 
spelled the end of the automatic injunction rule adopted in the early 1980s 
by the Federal Circuit. What makes eBay one of the most important 
Supreme Court patent cases in a century is its recognition that trolls use 
injunctions to extract excess value from defendants in patent cases. 
Though nominally not central to the Court’s holding, the discussion of 
“undue leverage” in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the intellectual 
heart of the opinion: 
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining 
76. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz., Our Divided Patent System, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1102–03 (2015).
77. I should point out that under one interpretation, the recent § 101 cases I discussed earlier
are mostly about claim breadth and thus indirectly therefore about infringement. Under this view, 101 
returns courts’ attention to the overall contribution made by the invention. This holistic or “gist of the 
contribution” approach was common in the era before formal claims even emerged in US patent law 
in the nineteenth century. See Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. 
REV. 645, 645 (2018): 
In our modern peripheral claiming system, the claim language is the near-exclusive guide 
to the patent’s boundaries. But in its earliest days, our patent system pursued a central 
claiming approach, in which the inventor’s actual work determined the patent’s scope. The 
[Supreme] Court’s eligibility [i.e., § 101] cases focus on the inventor’s actual contribution 
to the field, precisely as a central claiming inquiry would. And they can be better 
understood once this return to central claiming is revealed. 
78. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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licensing fees. . . . For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially 
serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent. . . . When the patented invention is but a 
small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the 
threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for 
the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.79 
We see here a clear-eyed understanding of the rise of patent trolls (“. . . 
[a]n industry has developed . . .”), and a sure grasp of the role of
injunctions in facilitating this rise (“exorbitant fees” caused by “undue
leverage”). Though some criticize eBay as a violation of the sanctity of
property rights,80 I and others commend the opinion for its pragmatism.81
Theory and concepts aside, eBay has both (1) significantly cut back on the
incentive to bring troll litigation, and (2) maintained the availability of the
injunctive remedy in the strong majority of cases in which it is warranted.
The post-eBay injunction grant rate is 75%.82
Though an injunction can be used to obtain a monetary settlement, 
the more direct monetary remedy in patent cases is damages. For trolls, 
litigation is strictly a monetary affair. Damages doctrine is thus a key 
focus for patent reform aimed at reducing litigation. The overall trend here 
might be described as “rationalization,” meaning an increase in the use of 
more precise analytic tools to rein in excessive damage awards. The 
emphasis is on developing more precise ways to measure the actual 
79. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring; joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Breyer, J.). 
80. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal 
Response to a Premature Obituary 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 494 (2010) (“Nothing in the traditional 
principles of equity requires that radical revision of the right to exclude that eBay seems to invite”). 
81. Merges, supra note 51: 
[Some say eBay means patents are no longer property rights.] The truth is otherwise: there 
are common and fairly frequent cases involving real property rights in which an injunction 
is not issued in favor of the property owner. . . .  [I]n each case, violation of a small
magnitude right would, if met with injunctive relief, result in a legal remedy worth a huge 
amount of money. The reward, in other words, is highly disproportional to the magnitude 
of the violation. This is precisely the situation in which injunctions are denied in patent
cases. It just so happens that, at least under conditions prevalent between 2000 or so and
2010, this small right/huge reward scenario was more common in patent law than in real
property cases. But the fact that this situation was more common with respect to patent
rights than real property rights does not in any way undermine the status of patents as
property. 
See also ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011), at Chapter 6 (“The 
Proportionality Principle”), pp. 159 ff. 
82. Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical
Study of the Federal Circuit’s Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 203 (2017). 
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economic loss suffered by a patent owner as a result of infringement. 
Progress has definitely been made, mostly (so far) in the form of ridding 
patent law of outdated and simplistic damages doctrine that often 
contributed to overcompensation, and that was in any event always highly 
imprecise. So, for example, courts have discarded a venerable but 
discredited “rule of thumb” that royalties for past infringement should be 
set at roughly 25% of the infringer’s revenue.83 The Federal Circuit has 
also ended the practice of basing an estimated royalty on the use of sample 
licensing agreements from an industry when those agreements were not 
truly comparable to the infringing situation.84 Although courts are still 
wrestling with more accurate ways to assess damages,85 the emphasis on 
accuracy assures continued vigilance against systematic 
overcompensation. The overall message is: rent seekers need not apply. 
5. Procedural Rules
The main reason litigation can be harmful is cost. Patent litigation is
particularly costly, because many technologies are complex and because 
the law itself is an intricate jumble of rules that must be disentangled and 
applied. And patent litigation in the U.S. takes place in federal courts—
famous for their embrace of a full-throated (and therefore expensive) 
commitment to due process. 
Cutting back on cost therefore entails reform of procedure as well as 
of legal substance. As mentioned, the “quick look” nature of recent § 101 
cases turns them into a procedural innovation, though masked as 
substance. The same is true—in reverse— of a critically important 
procedural reform from 2018. The Supreme Court’s decision in TC 
Heartland L.L.C. v. Kraft Foods Group Brands L.L.C.86 was ostensibly 
about procedure—namely, the law of venue—determining which U.S. 
district court can hear a particular case. But it was really about reining in 
83. Stuart Graham, Peter Menell, Cark Shapiro & Tim Simcoe, Final Report of the Berkeley 
Center for Law & Technology Patent Damages Workshop 15 August 2016, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 115, 124 (2017) (“There is a broad consensus among economists that there was little evidentiary 
support for the now-discarded 25% Rule of Thumb as it appears to have been commonly applied in
the United States.”). 
84. See generally Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U.L. 
REV. 115 (2015). 
85. See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1331‒1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(rejecting use of Nash bargaining framework, a conceptual tool used by economists, in calculating 
patent damages). See generally, MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 43, at 836–40 (Note on “Contemporary 
Approaches to Patent Damages”, discussing Nash bargaining, a statistical analysis technique called 
conjoint analysis, etc.). 
86. TC Heartland L.L.C. v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
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a “renegade court” that had leveraged a liberal venue rule to aggrandize 
its patent docket to ludicrous proportions.87 Thus a court in a region with 
modest economic activity became the epicenter of patent troll litigation.88 
TC Heartland put an end to this by stringently tightening venue in patent 
cases. The rule is couched in procedural terms, but its impact was 
substantive: the district court in question had minimized and avoided most 
aspects of patent reform to protect its patent-intensive litigation docket.89 
By moving cases out of this district, TC Heartland shifted the substantive 
balance of U.S. patent law. It is no longer disproportionately influenced 
by a pro-patent, pro-litigation court. 
While reform of the venue rule was the most pressing topic in 
procedural reform, many smaller-scale changes have been adopted in an 
attempt to streamline patent litigation. Many of these are described in the 
influential Patent Case Management Judicial Guide, produced by the 
Federal Judicial Center and given to all judges in patent cases.90 Individual 
federal districts have responded with detailed “Local Rules” that also 
work to provide an efficient, cost-effective litigation structure specifically 
adapted to patent cases.91 
87. See J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in A “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern
District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569 (2018). 
88. Robert G. Bone, Forum Shopping and Patent Law-A Comment on TC Heartland, 96 TEX. 
L. REV. 141, 144 (2017) (describing “forum selling by federal district courts” to attract troll litigation, 
seen as beneficial to the court’s local economy). 
89. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation 
in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2017): 
[W]e review evidence that judges in the Eastern District of Texas have generally ruled in 
ways that have minimized the effect of patent reform measures passed by Congress and
changes in the law articulated by higher courts. We find that East Texas judges are
disproportionately unlikely to stay cases pending post-grant challenges, to require  that
patentees litigate individual cases against individual defendants, to grant early motions to 
dismiss on patentable subject matter grounds, and to award attorney’s fees to prevailing
parties. 
90. Peter S. Menell, Lynn H. Pasahow, James Pooley, Matthew D. Powers, Steven C. Carlson, 
Jeffrey G. Homrig, George F. Pappas, Carolyn Chang, Colette Reiner Mayer, & Marc David Peters, 
PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE (3d ed. 2016), 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/321534/patent-case-management-judicial-guide-third-edition 
[https://perma.cc/JW3L-P3W3]. The Federal Judicial Center is an official branch of the U.S. court 
system responsible for judicial training. 
91. Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact of Local Patent Rules on Rate and Timing of Case
Resolution Relative to Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Past Decade, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. 
L. 451, 455 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he strict initial disclosure requirements and predictable
scheduling of claim construction reflected in the majority of local patent rules yields efficient and
merits-motivated case resolution—i.e., once claims are construed, parties know where they stand. By 
extension this should lower the uncertainty associated with litigation and make it more predictable.”). 
Cases that proceed under these local rules get to the “heart” of patent litigation – the meaning of claim 
terms, and thus the question of infringement – more efficiently: 
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B. Rolling Up the Loose Ends of Patent Reform
Taken all together, the reforms I described have fundamentally
reshaped the landscape of patent litigation. Many, if not most, were 
motivated by a desire to cut back on excessive (troll) litigation. They 
represent an impressive policy response to a challenging chapter in U.S. 
patent law. 
The system is still far from perfect. The biggest opportunity for 
future reform may be in tighter integration between the Patent Office and 
the courts. Due to the long history of judicial independence, and the 
separation of powers principle, courts are not required to stay (or suspend) 
district court litigation when patent validity is challenged in an IPR at the 
Patent Office. This can be wasteful. A more efficient approach would be 
to prevent court cases from proceeding until after the IPR is complete.92 
Another reform frontier is administrative fees in the Patent Office. 
We have just scratched the surface in this important area. Despite some 
persuasive modeling by economists over the years,93 those who shape 
patent policy have paid very little attention to the potential power of patent 
application fees, renewal fees, and other administrative fees as a 
mechanism to screen valuable from less valuable inventions and flush the 
less valuable ones out of the patent system.94 
V. CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, it seems there would be no litigation. Patent 
boundaries (and validity) would be crystal clear; damages would be 
perfectly predictable; and all patent conflicts would end with a willing, 
bilateral license. To paraphrase Grant Gilmore: the more efficient the 
Data analyzed in this study reveals that a relatively small percentage of cases—only ten 
percent—proceed to a decision on claim construction and, of those that do, a majority are 
resolved within a year of that milestone. Regarding the impact of local patent rules on 
claim construction, this study observes that, on average, more cases proceed to a decision 
on claim construction in jurisdictions with local patent rules, fourteen percent, than in 
jurisdictions without them, eight percent. 
Id. at 456. 
92. For a suggestion providing for even tighter integration, see Lauren Cohen, John M. Golden, 
Umit M. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers,”Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of 
Patent Litigation, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775 (2017). 
93. Especially Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND 
J. ECON. 181 (1999). 
94. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
677, 679–80 (2012); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 687, 715 (2010) (proposing greater attention to the cost of acquiring IP rights as a way to 
screen out less valuable contributions). 
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society, the fewer lawsuits there will be. In Pareto Heaven there will be 
no litigation, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.95 
But foresight is not perfect, attention and effort are limited, and time 
marches fast in the world of new technologies. All these conspire to render 
perfect market-making a distant, utopian dream. The reality is messier. In 
the technology domain it is inevitable, and maybe desirable, that people 
will put off some deal-making for tomorrow. 
When tomorrow comes, and the dust has at least partially settled on 
the race for a new technology, a surprising economic institution comes 
into play—patent litigation. After product winners have emerged, patent 
litigation can sort through who were the real contributors: which inventors 
and companies contributed crucial technologies and component designs, 
helping in the success of the new products? That patent litigation, and the 
patent system generally, is out of sync with the rapid-fire timing of 
innovation—that’s old news. What is new is an appreciation that this 
asynchronicity might have some hidden benefits. By decoupling patent 
disputes from technical and commercial cycles, patent law allows 
industries to burst forth at breakneck speed—with the promise that 
compensation for important contributors will take place. It just takes place 
later. 
But litigation—to advocate litigation! Is this really necessary to 
construct an ex post market? In this case, it appears the answer is yes. 
Real-time market-making can actually entail higher costs. And no rational 
economic actor, having gained a strong market position in real time, 
would go back and fully compensate all those who helped but were not 
compensated for it. Ok, in a few cases, maybe. But what about the 
enormous costs? Isn’t litigation almost always enormously expensive and 
wasteful? 
Expensive, yes. But patent reform over the recent past goes a long 
way toward eliminating one large source of social waste, rent-seeking. 
Any patent left standing these days after an IPR, or especially after 
litigation, probably represents a reasonably important technical 
contribution. Or, at any rate, an invention that satisfies the legal 
requirements for patentability to a fairly high degree of certainty. Of 
course, not all patents justify the expense of an IPR challenge; therefore, 
it can’t be safely said that all patents sold in portfolio sales or acquired in 
an M&A deal are of certifiable high quality. But the availability of IPRs, 
as well as all the more stringent doctrinal adjustments under patent reform, 
95. GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110–11 (1977)  (“The better the society, the
less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.”). 
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has undoubtedly reduced the incidence of rent-seeking through patents. 
The mere threat of an IPR, after all, will be enough to curb the least 
justifiable uses of patents to extract big chunks of unearned rents. 
Here is what I have been leading up to. The cumulative weight of 
recent reform ought to affect our assessment of patent litigation and ex 
post market-making. If, as I believe, reform has made rent-seeking via 
patents less likely and less profitable, then that is a good reason not to 
oppose patent litigation on principle. Rent-seeking via patents has become 
harder and less likely. It follows that from now on, we might expect 
litigation to be more a result of reasoned choices and less a matter of pure 
rent-seeking. 
Ideally, market exchanges for all production-related inputs take place 
in real time. But with a complex and tangled input such as new inventions 
and their associated patents, this timing is often not realistic. In this special 
case, an idiosyncratic economic institution has emerged. Patent litigation, 
at its best, helps form markets for important inventive inputs. But it does 
so ex post—after product markets have taken shape, and at least begun to 
mature. This temporal decoupling permits early contributors to get their 
due, even if they are not manufacturers, but component suppliers; or even 
if they are “failed” product companies. Patent litigation both sets the 
record straight regarding how an industry took form and provides some 
assurance that even in “winner take all” product markets, important early 
contributors who lose the primary race might get some share of the 
proceeds. As market-making goes, litigation is expensive, and far from 
perfect. But it does at least allow for a considered set of judgments about 
which inventions really contributed to a new technology or industry. It 
slows down the tape of a fast-moving game and hands out some awards 
to players who might have been overlooked in the heat of the action. In 
this way it contributes to a balancing of accounts. It enables an industry 
to take shape at breakneck speed. But it also enables the making of 
markets that make sense, given more time to consider the facts. Many 
inventors and companies want to win the big prize of product competition. 
But a smaller prize, in the form of compensation in the ex post patent 
market, surely beats none at all. 
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